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Abstract : Depending on how one classiﬁes market intervention, trade
liberalization disciplines can be lenient or strict. Perhaps the most important
distinction in this respect is that between government intervention labeled as
a ‘ market access restriction’ and that deﬁned as ‘domestic regulation’. Both the
GATT and the GATS declare market access restrictions (such as import quotas or
limitations on the number of service suppliers) to be, in principle, prohibited. In
contrast, domestic regulations (such as internal taxes, health standards, and safety
requirements) are treated with much more deference. They are, in essence, only
prohibited when discriminatory or more trade restrictive than necessary.
Notwithstanding these major legal consequences, the distinction between market
access and domestic regulation remains unclear. Based on a recent WTO dispute
condemning the United States for banning online gambling, this article is an
attempt to clarify the distinction. Starting from broad similarities, it ﬁnds crucial
diﬀerences in this respect between GATT and GATS. For both, however, the
paper’s basic point is that a domestic regulation should not be regarded as a
market access restriction simply because it has the eﬀect of banning certain
imports. To do otherwise risks seriously undermining the regulatory autonomy of
WTO Members beyond anything imagined by the drafters of the WTO treaty.

1. Introduction
On 7 April 2005, the World Trade Organization (WTO) condemned the United
States for banning online gambling.1 It did so at the request of one of the smallest
Correspondence: Email: PAUWELYN@law.duke.edu
* I am extremely grateful for comments and discussions with Lorand Bartels, Steve Charnovitz, Markus
Krajewski, Simon Lester, Jan Yves Remy, Joel Trachtman and the anonymous reviewers of the World
Trade Review. All errors remain mine alone.
1 Appellate Body Report on United States – Measures Aﬀecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services (‘US – Gambling’), WT/DS285/AB/R, circulated on 7 April 2005, partly reversing the
earlier Panel Report on US – Gambling, WT/DS285/R, circulated on 10 November 2004. For a brief
discussion of these two reports, see, respectively, Joost Pauwelyn, ‘ WTO Condemnation of U.S. Ban on
Internet Gambling Pits Free Trade against Moral Values’, ASIL Insight, November 2004, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/2004/11/insight041117.html and Joost Pauwelyn, ‘WTO Softens Earlier
Condemnation of U.S. Ban on Internet Gambling, but Conﬁrms Broad Reach into Sensitive Domestic
Regulation’, ASIL Insight, April 2005, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/04/insights050412.
html.
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countries in the world, Antigua and Barbuda. Antigua brought its complaint to the
WTO after Jay Cohen, a US citizen and operator of an internet sports-book service
based in Antigua, was jailed in the United States for the remote supply of gambling
services in violation of the 1961 US Wire Communications Act.2
This paper does not address whether the United States did, indeed, make speciﬁc
commitments for gambling services under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS).3 Nor does it deal with the panel’s controversial rejection of the
US defense (only partly reversed by the Appellate Body) that its gambling laws are
‘necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order’.4 The question of
whether the United States, either in law or eﬀect, discriminates against foreign
gambling suppliers is also left open.5 Instead, the paper raises a systemic argument
of considerable importance for the future of the GATS. It runs as follows. Even if
the United States did make speciﬁc commitments on gambling, the US ban on
remote gambling is not, as both the panel and the Appellate Body found, a ‘market
access restriction ’ that is, in principle, prohibited under Article XVI of GATS.
Rather, it is a ‘domestic regulation’ subject to Articles VI and XVII of GATS, more
particularly, a technical standard applying to both foreign and US suppliers that
prescribes how gambling services must be performed in the United States.
To construe trade-related policies as market access restrictions, whilst they are
in fact domestic regulation – as, in my view, occurred in US – Gambling – has
major legal consequences. In contrast to more integrated trade liberalization
schemes such as the European Union or the United States,6 both the GATS
and the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) make crucial distinctions between market access restrictions and domestic regulation. In essence,
where commitments are made, market access restrictions are, in principle,
prohibited.7 Domestic regulation, in contrast, is subject to broad regulatory
autonomy and, as a rule, violates GATT or GATS only when it discriminates
against imports.
Notwithstanding this basic distinction in two of the main pillars of the
WTO, the boundaries between market access and domestic regulation remain
2 United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2nd Cir. 2001), cert. Denied 122 S.Ct. 2587 (2002).
3 As both the Panel and the Appellate Body concluded pursuant to GATS Article XVI and the US
schedule of GATS commitments. See Panel and Appellate Body Report on US – Gambling, respectively,
para. 6.134 and para. 213.
4 Pursuant to Article XIV of GATS. See Panel and Appellate Body Report on US – Gambling, respectively, para. 6.608 and para. 372. Eventually, the Appellate Body rejected the US defense only for
failure to meet the non-discrimination standard in the chapeau of GATS Article XIV, more speciﬁcally,
because it was not convinced that the United States was treating foreign and domestic service suppliers
equally under its Interstate Horseracing Act.
5 Pursuant to the national treatment obligation in Article XVII of GATS, a question eventually not
addressed in the panel report for reasons of judicial economy. See Panel Report on US – Gambling,
para. 6.426.
6 See infra Section 2.3.
7 Unless justiﬁed under explicit exceptions, in particular, the exhaustive list of legitimate policy
objectives in GATT Articles XX/XXI or GATS Articles XIV/XIVbis.
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unsettled. This paper is an attempt to draw those boundaries using, in particular,
the example of the US – Gambling case. Far beyond the speciﬁcs of the Gambling
dispute, a correct classiﬁcation of policy instruments under WTO law is important
for a wide range of market interventions, be it to protect public morals, health,
the environment, or national security. Driven to its logical conclusion, the
approach in US – Gambling risks WTO intrusion into the regulatory freedom
of WTO Members far beyond what was originally agreed to in the WTO Treaty.8
The classiﬁcation is crucial also for ongoing negotiations on disciplines for
domestic regulation under Article VI:4 of GATS. Essentially, if the scope of
market access restrictions under Article XVI of GATS were deﬁned too broadly, as
risks being the case after US – Gambling, scores of domestic regulations would
already be prohibited and the ongoing negotiations would lose much of their
purpose.
Section 2 of this paper explains the distinction between market access and
domestic regulation. It highlights similarities – as well as some crucial diﬀerences – between GATT and GATS, and contrasts the WTO approach with the
more integrated systems of EC and US law where the distinction is largely absent.
Section 3 elaborates on how the two disciplines are circumscribed and interact,
ﬁrst in GATT, then in GATS. At this juncture, additional diﬀerences between the
GATT and GATS become apparent. To provide a concrete example, Section 4
applies the position defended in this paper to the US laws in the Gambling dispute.
Section 5 summarizes the paper’s main ﬁndings.

2. The distinction between market access and domestic regulation
Both GATT and GATS make important distinctions between types of government
policies that may restrict trade. Those distinctions are not merely legal niceties.
They reﬂect both economic and political preferences of certain types of policies
over others and lead to drastically diﬀerent disciplines and restrictions on the
regulatory autonomy of WTO Members. Depending solely on how a government
measure is categorized, the measure may therefore be permitted or prohibited
under WTO law. Put diﬀerently, when misinterpreting those distinctions (as, in my
view, the Panel and the Appellate Body did in US – Gambling), the risk is that
WTO violations are found where the drafters of the WTO treaty envisaged broad
regulatory autonomy.

2.1 Market access versus domestic regulation under GATT
Under GATT the crucial dividing line amongst policy instruments aﬀecting trade
is between, on the one hand, measures imposed at the border or on importation
8 Hence, the title of this paper Rien Ne Va Plus (which can be translated from the French as ‘ from now
on nothing is possible’) alluding both to (i) the risk that, after Gambling, scores of domestic regulations
may be inconsistent with GATS, and (ii) the phrase used in casinos to signal that ‘ bets are oﬀ ’.
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and, on the other hand, measures aﬀecting imports once they have cleared
customs. The former – often referred to as ‘ border measures ’ or ‘ market access
restrictions ’ – are covered by Articles II and XI of GATT, addressing, respectively,
custom duties and other duties or charges imposed on or in connection with
importation (Article II) and quantitative import prohibitions or restrictions
(Article XI). The latter – commonly referred to as ‘behind the border measures’
or ‘domestic regulation’ – are dealt with in Article III addressing internal taxation
(such as VAT or sales taxes) and other internal regulations (such as safety requirements or sales regulations).
The legal consequences linked to those GATT distinctions are vital. Most
importantly, whilst market access measures taking the form of quantitative
restrictions are, in principle, prohibited (pursuant to Article XI), GATT parties
reserved their sovereign prerogative to set domestic regulation, be it internal taxes,
safety standards, or sales requirements, on the sole condition that such regulation
does not favor domestic products over imports (pursuant to Article III). Put
diﬀerently, when a measure is found to be a border measure subject to Article XI,
it is prima facie prohibited. In contrast, when the measure is qualiﬁed as a domestic
regulation under Article III, it can only be found afoul of GATT rules when it is
discriminatory.9
Sound economic and political reasons for the GATT distinction between market
access and domestic regulation are readily available. In economic terms, border or
market access measures – be it custom duties or import quotas – by deﬁnition only
apply to imports and can therefore be presumed to be imposed for protectionist
purposes. Since protectionist measures are, in general, economically wasteful and
harmful to both foreign producers and domestic consumers, there is a strong case
to prohibit them or, at least, to gradually reduce them (as is the case for tariﬀs).10
Domestic regulation, in contrast, most often serves legitimate, non-protectionist
purposes, be it consumer protection, safety, or health. As a result, it made sense for
the GATT to overrule domestic regulation only when it is proven to be protectionist, more particularly, when it discriminates against imports, that is, when it

9 Both violations of Article XI and Article III can, however, be justiﬁed under speciﬁc GATT exceptions. Importantly, given the per se prohibition in Article XI, the list of exceptions under Article XI is
longer than that under Article III. The former includes not only GATT Articles XX and XXI (general and
security exceptions), but also GATT Articles XI:2, XII (balance of payments restrictions) and XIII–XIV
(discriminatory and non-discriminatory quotas). In this sense, to construe a measure as an Article XI
quantitative restriction not only has beneﬁts for the complainant, it may also oﬀer more leeway for the
party enacting the measure: Although an Article XI measure is prima facie prohibited, the list of potential
justiﬁcations for it is broader.
10 The GATT thereby expresses a clear preference for tariﬀs (subject only to tariﬀ ceilings) over quotas
(which are, in principle, prohibited), a position that is supported by economic theory. See Arthur Dunkel
and Frieder Roessler, ‘ The Ranking of Trade Policy Instruments under the GATT Legal System’ (on ﬁle
with the author) and Alan Sykes, ‘ Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade’, 66
University of Chicago Law Review 1 (1999).
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imposes so-called deadweight costs on foreign ﬁrms that are not imposed on
domestic ﬁrms.11
In political terms, the distinction is equally palatable. Whilst most border
measures, such as tariﬀs or quotas, serve purely economic interests, in particular,
the protection of national industries, much domestic regulation goes to the social
and political heart of a country’s sovereignty, addressing sensitive areas such as
health and consumer protection, environmental concerns and income redistribution through taxation. Consequently, WTO Members felt more at ease committing to the elimination or reduction in tariﬀs and quantitative import
restrictions, than tying their hands in the politically more sensitive ﬁeld of domestic
regulation. As market access restrictions can be seen as pure trade measures, they
fall squarely within the mandate of the GATT. The GATT has, in contrast, little
to say about how nations assess domestic market failure as long as they do so in
a non-discriminatory manner.
Only with the creation of the 1994 WTO agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) did disciplines on domestic
regulation move beyond the rule of non-discrimination.12 Indeed, under the SPS
and TBT agreements, even a measure that is not discriminatory, i.e., treats imports
and domestic products alike both de jure and de facto, can still breach SPS or TBT
disciplines if it is, for example, not based on a risk assessment (SPS Article 5.1) or
more trade restrictive than necessary to protect human health (SPS Article 5.6)
or to fulﬁll any other legitimate, non-protectionist objective (TBT Article 2.2).
However, as GATT continues to apply in tandem with SPS and TBT rules, the
distinction between market access and domestic regulation remains crucial.13

2.2 Market access versus domestic regulation under GATS
Unlike the physical movement of goods across borders, the intangible nature of
services (ranging from banking and telecommunications to distribution and
construction) means that they generally escape the physical control of customs
oﬃcials. As a result, countries wanting to protect their domestic services industry
cannot normally impose the traditional trade in goods instruments of tariﬀs or
import quotas.14 Yet, for the same economic and political reasons explained

11 Note, however, that when domestic regulation does discriminate against imports, it constitutes the
least eﬃcient form of protection as compared with all other forms of protection. See Dunkel and Roessler,
supra note 11 and Sykes, supra note 10.
12 GATT Article X on publication and impartial administration of trade regulations is an exception to
this rule. From GATT’s inception in 1947 this transparency provision did apply to all trade regulations,
including non-discriminatory domestic regulations.
13 See Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Cross-agreement Complaints before the Appellate Body: A Case Study of the
EC – Asbestos Dispute’, 1 World Trade Review (2002), 63.
14 For a background to the GATS, see Aaditya Mattoo, ‘Shaping Future Rules for Trade in Services,
Lessons from the GATS’ (mimeo, World Bank, July 2000) and Pierre Sauve and Robert Stern (eds), GATS
2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2000).
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earlier, the GATT distinction between market access and domestic regulation has
its functional equivalent also under GATS.
Like tariﬀs and import quotas under GATT, government intervention in the
services industry that quantitatively restricts the very access or establishment
of foreign services or service suppliers to a country’s domestic market, is subject
to a diﬀerent discipline than so-called domestic regulations addressing the quality
of a service or its supplier. The former, market access restrictions, are dealt
with in Article XVI of GATS. The latter, domestic regulations, are addressed
predominantly in Articles VI, XVII and XVIII of GATS.15
As is the case under GATT, the distinction thus made by GATS between market
access and domestic regulation has vital legal consequences. Like quantitative
restrictions under Article XI of GATT, the market access restrictions speciﬁed
in Article XVI of GATS16 are, for committed services sectors,17 in principle,
prohibited (unless they are explicitly listed in the Member’s schedule). In contrast,
like domestic regulations under Article III of GATT, domestic regulations aﬀecting
the supply of services are, in principle, permitted on condition that they do not
discriminate foreign as against domestic services or service suppliers.18

15 For literature on domestic regulation under GATS, see Aaditya Mattoo and Pierre Sauve (eds),
Domestic Regulation and Service Trade Liberalization (Washington, DC: World Bank 2003) and Markus
Krajewski, National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services : The Legal Impact of the GATS on
National Regulatory Autonomy (Kluwer Law International, 2003).
16 GATS Article XVI enumerates six prohibited market access restrictions for those services where a
WTO Member made market access commitments :
(a)

limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test;
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas or
the requirement of an economic needs test;
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output
expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an
economic needs test;
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular service
sector or that a service supplier may employ and who are necessary for, and directly related to, the
supply of a speciﬁc service in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic
needs test;
(e) measures which restrict or require speciﬁc types of legal entity or joint venture through which a
service supplier may supply a service; and
(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on
foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment.
17 That is, services sectors explicitly listed in a Member’s schedule in the Article XVI market access
column. For sectors not so listed, WTO Members maintain the right to impose market access restrictions.
18 Pursuant to Article XVII of GATS which is, moreover (in contrast to national treatment under
GATT) only triggered for committed services sectors and is subject to explicit exceptions in a Member’s
schedule. One possible reason for this distinction between GATT and GATS is that both agreements
recognize the need (mainly political) for some protectionism. In GATT, this need is channeled predominantly through the tariﬀ instrument; in GATS, where tariﬀs are not a readily available instrument,
such protection, by default, is more likely to take the form of discriminatory regulation. As a result,
reservations under GATS national treatment became crucial.
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Comparable with the SPS and TBT agreements for trade in goods, Articles VI
and XVIII of GATS add further discipline for domestic service regulations, in
particular those that are not discriminatory. Put diﬀerently, even a service measure
that does not qualify as a market access restriction under Article XVI and does
not discriminate foreign as against domestic services or service suppliers under
Article XVII, can still run afoul of GATS. First, under Article XVIII it may
violate a so-called additional commitment speciﬁcally inscribed in a Member’s
schedule (such as the competition-type rules in the telecom sector committed to by
a number of WTO Members).19 Second, under Article VI the measure may be
inconsistent with the transparency and impartial administration requirements of
paragraphs 1 to 3, or be found to restrict trade more than necessary contrary to
paragraph 5.20
However, like the SPS and TBT disciplines for trade in goods, which were only
established decades after the GATT’s original conclusion in 1947, most of the
rules and restrictions in respect of domestic service regulations remain to be set in
ongoing and future GATS negotiations. In particular, pursuant to Article VI :4 of
GATS, the Council for Trade in Services is to ‘ develop any necessary disciplines ’,
with a view to ‘ensuring that measures relating to qualiﬁcation requirements
and procedures, technical standards, and licensing requirements do not
constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services ’. In 1998, the GATS Council
adopted the ﬁrst, and so far only, set of disciplines under Article VI :4 applicable
to domestic regulation in the accountancy sector.21 Awaiting the adoption of
further disciplines, Article VI :5 only prohibits licensing, qualiﬁcation, and
technical requirements that (i) nullify speciﬁc commitments made by the WTO
Member concerned under Articles XVI–XVIII by means of (ii) unnecessary
barriers to trade, as deﬁned in the broad guidelines of Article VI :4,22 and (iii) could
not reasonably have been expected at the time those speciﬁc GATS commitments
were made.23

19 See the Panel Report on Mexico – Measures Aﬀecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R,
adopted 1 June 2004 (not appealed).
20 Crucially, however, with the exception of paragraphs 2 and 4, all Article VI disciplines on domestic
regulation only apply in those services sectors for which the WTO Member in question made speciﬁc
commitments under Articles XVI–XVIII.
21 Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, Decision of the GATS Council of
14 December 1998, S/L/64.
22 The Article VI:4 guidelines require that future disciplines on domestic regulation aim to ensure that
such regulations are:
(a)

based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the
service;
(b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service;
(c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the service.
23 See infra text at notes 127 and 128.
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Crucially, therefore, at this stage GATS negotiators explicitly refused to impose
a general necessity test on non-discriminatory domestic regulation.24 With the
exception of the accountancy sector, any such test remains to be developed. What
the Panel (and to a lesser extent the Appellate Body)25 on US – Gambling did,
however, was to impose such a test through the backdoor, that is, by ﬁnding, ﬁrst,
that the US gambling laws are prohibited market access restrictions and, second,
failing those laws under the necessity test in the Article XIV exceptions on,
inter alia, public morals.26 In the process, the Panel even went beyond any to-bedeveloped necessity requirement, by shifting the burden of proving necessity from
Antigua to the United States and limiting the substantive grounds for justiﬁcation
to the exhaustive list in Article XIV (instead of the more open list of Article VI : 4
and the Accountancy Guidelines).
This highlights another reason to carefully distinguish between market access
and domestic regulation under GATS : namely, the available range of exceptions or
policy objectives that may justify the trade restriction and the burden of proof that
comes with it.27 Violations of Article XVI (market access) and Article XVII
(national treatment) can only be justiﬁed under the exhaustive list of exceptions in
Articles XIV and XIV bis (general and security exceptions). Moreover, the burden
of proof under those exceptions rests on the defendant (the Member enacting the
measure), i.e. it is for the defendant to demonstrate that the measure is necessary to
protect public morals. In contrast, similar to the open list of policy objectives in
TBT Article 2.2, the list of potential justiﬁcations under Article VI of GATS
and the Accountancy Guidelines is broader.28 Article VI :4 refers to ‘ objective and
transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the service ’ and
to measures ‘not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the
service ’, without deﬁning what factors or objectives can be considered under
quality. Moreover, the burden of proof under Article VI rests on the complainant,
i.e., it is for the complainant to demonstrate that the measure is not necessary for
its stated objective. In addition, even if a measure violates Article VI, it can, in
theory, still be justiﬁed under the general exceptions of Articles XIV/XIV bis,

24 Unlike the ﬁrst draft of the GATS (MTN.GNS/35 of 23 July 1990, Article VII), which contained the
following necessity requirement for all domestic regulation:
Parties may require that services or providers of services of other parties meet certain regulations,
standards or qualiﬁcations. Such requirements shall be based upon objective criteria, such as
competence and the ability to provide such services, and not be more burdensome than necessary to
achieve the national policy objectives. (emphasis added)
25 As noted supra note 4, the Appellate Body did not fault the US laws on the ground that they were
not ‘necessary’ under Article XIV, but rather because their application was discriminatory under the
chapeau of Article XIV.
26 Panel Report on US – Gambling, paras. 6.535 and 6.565.
27 For a similar analysis under GATT, see supra footnote 9.
28 Compare in this respect, TBT Article 2.2 with paragraph 2 of the Accountancy Disciplines. Both
refer to ‘a legitimate objective’ and then provide a non-exhaustive list of legitimate objectives.
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although in practice this may be diﬃcult.29 Finally, it must be kept in mind that,
whilst measures contrary to GATS Articles XVI and XVII can be scheduled (that
is, explicitly listed as reserved under a Member’s market access or national
treatment column), violations under Article VI (domestic regulation) cannot be
scheduled.30
The distinctions thus made at the WTO between trade policy instruments
and how GATT and GATS generally compare in this respect, are summarized in
Table 1.31

2.3 Contrast with the EC Treaty and the US Dormant Commerce Clause
The important distinctions thus made at the WTO between market access and
domestic regulation stand in sharp contrast to the more uniform liberalization of
trade in more integrated regimes such as the European Union or the United States.
The Treaty Establishing the European Community (‘ EC Treaty ’), for example,
does not have a separate provision dealing with domestic regulation (similar to
GATT Article III :4). At the border, it bans customs duties and ‘ all charges having
equivalent eﬀect ’32 (in contrast to GATT Article II, which only prohibits tariﬀs
that exceed a country’s bindings). The EC Treaty also prohibits the discrimination
of imports, both direct and indirect, through internal taxation.33 However, it
lumps together the distinction made in GATT between quantitative import
restrictions (GATT Article XI) and domestic regulation aﬀecting imports (GATT
Article III :4). It does so in its Article 28, which prohibits ‘[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent eﬀect ’. The latter has been
interpreted broadly to include ‘ [a]ll trading rules enacted by Member States which
are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intraCommunity trade ’.34 In other words, Article 28 includes quotas or restrictions on
importation and domestic regulation that also restricts imports.35

29 First, whilst Article VI:4 seems to oﬀer a relatively open list of legitimate policy objectives, Article
XIV (much like GATT Article XX) oﬀers a closed list of objectives. If the measure does not ﬁt under an
open list, it is unlikely to ﬁt under a closed list. Second, although Article VI refers to a basis in ‘objective
and transparent criteria’, it does not include the non-discrimination and other requirements that the
chapeau of Article XIV imposes (i.e. the ultimate and only ground on which the Appellate Body faulted the
US gambling laws). To some extent, and quite paradoxically, the exception (Article XIV) may thus be
more diﬃcult to meet than the rule (Article VI).
30 See Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory Note, MTN.GNS/W/164,
3 September 1993, para. 5 (hereafter ‘1993 Scheduling Guidelines’).
31 See also Gabrielle Marceau and Joel Trachtman, ‘TBT, SPS, and GATT: A Map of the WTO Law
of Domestic Regulation’, 36 Journal of World Trade (2001), 811 and Joel Trachtman, Lessons for the
GATS from Existing WTO Rules on Domestic Regulation, in Mattoo and Sauve, supra note 15, at 57.
32 Article 23 EC Treaty.
33 Article 90 EC Treaty.
34 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] ECR 837, para. 5.
35 For a further comparison between EC and WTO rules in this respect, see Jochem Wiers, Trade and
Environment in the EC and the WTO: A Legal Analysis (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2004), 46.
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Table 1.
DISCIPLINE
MARKET
ACCESS restrictions

in principle,
prohibited

DOMESTIC regulation
(including taxes)

non-discrimination
(national treatment)
transparency,
necessity, etc. even
for non-discriminatory
measures

GATT – GOODS

GATS – SERVICES

*Article II
(subject to tariﬀ
bindings)
*Article XI

Article XVI (subject to
commitments)

Article III
*Article X
*SPS agreement
*TBT agreement

Article XVII (subject
to commitments)
*Article VI (subject
to commitments)
*Article XVIII
(subject to commitments)
*Disciplines (to be)
developed by the
GATS Council

Equally, the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause in the US Constitution36 can,
in principle, cover all state measures that impede the ﬂow of interstate commerce
whether they take the form of border measures or internal regulation. If the statute
facially discriminates against interstate commerce it is deemed ‘virtually per se
invalid ’.37 However, even if there is no facial discrimination the statute can be
struck down if ‘ the burden imposed [on interstate commerce]_ is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local beneﬁt’.38

36 US CONST. art. I, · 8, cl. 3, which expressly grants Congress the power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce_
among the several states’.
37 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 US 93, 99 (1994).
38 Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 US at 142. Because of their broad coverage – including market access
restrictions and domestic regulation, discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures – the exceptions
available under EC and US law to justify facially prohibited measures are much broader than those in the
exhaustive lists of GATT Articles XX and XXI (and GATS Articles XIV and XIV bis). In the EC, measures
that are not discriminatory do not violate Article 28 of the EC Treaty if they are ‘necessary in order to
satisfy mandatory requirements’, essentially any legitimate policy objective (Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78,
[1979] ECR 649, para. 9). Case law under the US Dormant Commerce Clause refers to any ‘ legitimate
local public interest’ (Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 US at 142). The additional disciplines for domestic
regulation under the TBT agreement and GATS Article VI have an equally open list of justiﬁed policy
objectives (see TBT Article 2.2 and GATS Article VI :4, discussed supra note 29). Crucially, however, if
WTO panels were to make domestic regulation subject to the per se prohibition of quantitative restrictions
in GATT Article XI or GATS Article XVI – as happened in US – Gambling did – the limited list of justiﬁed
policy objectives for such per se prohibitions under both GATT and GATS (respectively, Articles XX/XXI
and XIV/XI bis, see supra text at note 27) would be vastly inappropriate, much more so than it is,
according to many observers, already today. Moreover, unlike the European Court of Justice or the US
Supreme Court, the WTO Appellate Body, which wisely follows a more textual interpretation of the WTO
treaty, would ﬁnd it extremely hard, if not impossible, to widen the list of, for example, GATT Article XX
exceptions through case law without legislative input from WTO Members themselves. As noted earlier
(see supra text at notes 27–30), this makes the scope of available exceptions another important factor to
consider before blurring the line between market access and domestic regulation at the WTO.
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The reason why EC and US laws do not give much weight to the diﬀerence
between market access and domestic regulation is obvious. As these are much
more integrated systems than the quasi-universal WTO, both economically and
politically, to strike down domestic regulation based on its trade eﬀects is, in those
settings, less controversial and can be remedied more easily. Put diﬀerently, whilst
the mandate of the WTO does not, in principle, extend to identifying appropriate
domestic regulation, the mandate of the EC and especially that of the US does
include the harmonization of domestic regulation.

3. How do disciplines on market access and domestic regulation interact ?
Since the qualiﬁcation of a measure as either a market access restriction or a
domestic regulation can determine its consistency with WTO rules, it is crucially
important to circumscribe the conﬁnes of these two sets of disciplines. Some
measures are clearly market access restrictions, such as custom duties on goods
(Article II of GATT) or limitations on the participation of foreign capital in banks
(Article XVI :2(f) of GATS). Other measures are without doubt domestic
regulation, such as a value-added tax on all goods sold (Article III :2 of GATT),
educational requirements to practice medicine, or a driving test to obtain a taxi
license (Article VI of GATS).
In contrast, for a considerable number of trade instruments, the distinction
between market access and domestic regulation is not as obvious.39 For example, is
a ban on the importation of asbestos products or shrimps caught without appropriate turtle protection devices (TEDs), in combination with, respectively, a
domestic ban on asbestos and an obligation on all domestic ﬁsherman to use TEDs,
a border measure or rather the extension of domestic regulation to imports ?
Equally, as was the situation in the Gambling dispute, is a prohibition on the
remote supply of certain gambling services, thereby eﬀectively banning the crossborder supply of such services, in combination with a domestic ban on remote
gambling, a market access restriction or rather the extension of domestic regulation to imports ?
To provide an answer to these questions a careful examination of, respectively,
the relationship between Articles XI and III of GATT and Articles XVI and
VI/XVII/XVIII of GATS is required. Whilst some precedents exist on this interaction under GATT, the Gambling case is the very ﬁrst dispute to address the
relationship under GATS.40
39 Further complicating the picture is that one and the same measure may fall under both GATT and
GATS and be classiﬁed diﬀerently under each of those agreements. See Joost Pauwelyn, Conﬂict of Norms
in Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 399–405.
40 The interaction between GATT disciplines on market access in the form of tariﬀs, on the one hand,
and domestic regulation in the form of internal taxation, on the other, is explicitly regulated and not
further addressed in this paper. Article II :2(a) makes it clear that GATT’s ban on tariﬀs above a country’s
bindings does not prevent ‘ a charge equivalent to an internal tax ’ imposed consistently with Article III:2.
Read together with the Ad Note to Article III (discussed infra, text at note 41), Article II (tariﬀs) and
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3.1 The relationship between Article XI (quantitative restrictions)
and Article III (national treatment) of GATT
1. Domestic regulation that applies to both domestic and imported products is
subject to GATT Article III (Ad Note to Article III)
A pivotal factor in determining the relation between Articles XI and III of GATT
is the Ad Note to Article III, which provides :
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement
of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product and
to the like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded
as an internal tax or internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the
kind referred to in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions of
Article III. (emphasis added)

Put diﬀerently, even if a trade restrictive measure is applied at the time or point of
importation, and could therefore be regarded as a border measure subject to
Article XI of GATT, it must still be analyzed as a domestic regulation under Article
III if, but only if it applies to both imports and like domestic products.41
This means in essence that, for measures applied to both imports and domestic
products, a preference is given to Article III over Article XI. Given the aboveexplained reasons for, and legal consequences of, the distinction between Articles
III and XI of GATT, this preference is entirely logical. In principle, the objectives
behind domestic regulation – for example, protecting human health against
harmful substances – apply to all products put on the market, be they domestically
produced or imported. The sole fact that for imports the regulation is enforced at
the time of importation, because it is the only or most eﬃcient time to do so,
should not transform the domestic regulation as it applies to imports into a border
measure that under Article XI is, in principle, prohibited. Otherwise, all domestic
regulation, as it applies to imports, risks being translated into prohibited border
measures.

Article III:2 (internal taxes) can, therefore, be regarded as mutually exclusive. The same applies in respect
of the relation between, on the one hand, Article II on tariﬀs and Article III:2 on internal taxes and, on the
other hand, Article XI on quantitative restrictions. Article XI:1 is stated to apply exclusively to ‘ prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges’. The latter remain subject only to either
Article II (tariﬀs) or Article III :2 (internal taxation). See, for example, the Panel Report on Dominican
Republic – Measures Aﬀecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R, circulated
on 26 November 2004, at para. 7.84 (a point that was not appealed). On the relationship between
‘ordinary customs duties’ and ‘ other duties or charges’ both referred to in GATT Article II, see the Panel
and Appellate Body Reports on Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain
Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/R and AB/R, adopted on 23 October 2002.
41 As noted supra in note 40 this paper does not further examine GATT rules on tariﬀs and internal
taxation: GATT disciplines on tariﬀs (Article II) and internal taxation (Article III:2) are set up explicitly as
mutually exclusive, as are those on tariﬀs and internal taxation, on the one hand, and quantitative restrictions (Article XI), on the other.
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In other words, the mere fact that a qualitative measure – say, a ban on asbestos
or safety speciﬁcation for cars – also has the eﬀect of restricting the quantity of
imports (in casu it bans also imported asbestos or keeps out imported cars that do
not meet the safety speciﬁcation) does not make that measure a quantitative import restriction that is, in principle, prohibited under Article XI.42 If the measure
applies to both imports and domestic production (i.e., it bans both imported and
domestic asbestos or regulates the safety of domestic and imported cars), it must be
examined as a domestic regulation under Article III and can, in consequence, only
be found to breach GATT rules if it discriminates imports as against domestic
products. Because of the Ad note to Article III, the prohibition in Article XI only
prevents quantitative restrictions imposed solely on imports (such as a ban or
quota on shoe imports without restrictions on domestic shoe production). To apply the Article XI prohibition to all measures, including domestic regulations, on
the sole ground that they have the eﬀect of restricting imports would ﬂy in the face
of GATT’s presumption in favor of regulatory autonomy in Article III of GATT.
This line of reasoning was conﬁrmed in GATT practice. Most prominently, the
1984 Panel Report on Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review
Act agreed with Canada that
the [GATT] distinguishes between measures aﬀecting the ‘importation’ of
products, which are regulated in Article XI:1, and those aﬀecting ‘imported
products’, which are dealt with in Article III.43

Importantly, the Panel added :
If Article XI :1 were interpreted broadly to cover also internal requirements,
Article III would be partly superﬂuous.44

Other panels refused to apply Article XI of GATT to a licensing system for tobacco
imports that served merely to enforce domestic quantitative regulations,45 to a sixpack conﬁguration requirement on imported beer in Canada,46 and to listing and
delisting practices restricting imports enacted by state-operated liquor stores in
certain parts of the United States.47 Each time, instead of Article XI and its presumptive prohibition, the panel applied Article III on the ground that the measure
covered both imports and domestic products or did not apply to importation as

42 In contrast to Article 28 of the EC Treaty, which explicitly includes ‘[q]uantitative restrictions on
imports and all measures having equivalent eﬀect’. See supra text at notes 34 and 35.
43 Panel report on Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, L/5504, adopted
on 7 February 1984, BISD 30S/140, 162–163, para. 5.14.
44 Ibid.
45 Working Party report on The Haitian Tobacco Monopoly, L/454, adopted on 22 November 1955,
BISD 4S/38, 39, para. 9.
46 Panel report on Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial
Marketing Agencies, DS17/R, adopted 18 February 1992, BISD 39S/27, 75, para. 5.4.
47 Panel report on United States – Measures Aﬀecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23/R, adopted
19 June 1992, 39S/206, 292, para. 5.63.
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such, but rather to the point of sale. Consequently, in each dispute, the panel only
found a violation in case imports were discriminated against domestic products.
The Panel on United States – Measures Aﬀecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages,
addressing the listing and delisting practices in certain US liquor stores, put it thus:
[T]he listing and delisting practices here at issue do not aﬀect importation as such
into the United States and should be examined under Article III:4 _ the issue is
not whether the practices in the various states aﬀect the right to importation as
such, in that they clearly apply to both domestic (out-of-state) and imported
wines; rather, the issue is whether the listing and delisting practices accord less
favourable treatment _ to imported wine than that accorded to the like domestic
product. Consequently, the Panel decided to analyze the state listing and delisting
practices as internal measures under Article III :4.48

Although the Appellate Body has not been called upon to rule on the relation
between Articles III and XI of GATT, in a number of WTO disputes the question
did arise. The Panel on European Communities – Measures Aﬀecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (‘ EC – Asbestos ’), agreed with the EC that France’s
import ban on asbestos fell under Article III, rejecting a Canadian argument that
the measure ought rather be examined under Article XI.49 Here, as well, the
deciding factor was that the ban, though applied for imports at the time of
importation, was also applied to domestic products. As a result, the asbestos
restriction was not a border measure that is, in principle, prohibited under Article
XI. Rather, the panel construed it as a domestic regulation subject to Article III
and only found it to be in violation of GATT because, in the view of the panel
(subsequently reversed by the Appellate Body), the measure discriminated
imported asbestos products (which were banned) against domestic alternatives
to asbestos (which were permitted).50
In similar vein, the Panel on India – Measures Aﬀecting the Automotive Sector
(‘ India – Autos ’), noted :
The use of the term ‘importation’ in Article XI, rather than ‘imports’, or
‘imported products’, clearly suggests that what is targeted in Article XI:1 is
exclusively those restrictions which relate to the importation itself, and not to
already imported products _ it is the nature of the measure as a restriction in
48 Ibid.
49 Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, WT/DS135/R and Add.1, adopted 5 April 2001, para. 8.93, as
modiﬁed by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS135/AB/R.
50 In the Panel Report on United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(WT/DS58/R and Corr.1, adopted 6 November 1998, as modiﬁed by the Appellate Body Report, WT/
DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998: VII, 2821), the question of whether the import ban on certain shrimp (which was
at least partly the extension of domestic regulation on US shrimp ﬁsherman to imported shrimp) was a
border measure under Article XI or domestic regulation under Article III was not discussed. The US
conceded that the ban violated Article XI and based its defense directly on Article XX of GATT. See also
Panel Report on United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, para. 5.20, as upheld
by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/RW.
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relation to importation which is the key factor to consider in determining
whether a measure may properly fall within the scope of Article XI:1.51

2. When a measure is subject to the Ad Note to Article III, Article III
applies to the exclusion of Article XI
Although the Ad Note does not explicitly say so, when it directs application of
Article III for measures where Article XI could be seen as relevant (since the
measure ‘ is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or
point of importation ’), by implication, it must be read as doing so at the exclusion
of Article XI. In other words, when the Ad Note does apply and a measure ‘ is
nevertheless to be regarded as _ [one] subject to the provisions of Article III
[notwithstanding the apparent relevance of Article XI] ’, the same measure cannot
be subject also to Article XI. At least to this extent, the scope of application of
Articles III and XI is mutually exclusive in favor of Article III.52 This is illustrated
51 Panel Report on India – Autos, WT/DS146/R and Corr.1, WT/DS175/R and Corr.1, adopted
5 April 2002, paras. 7.259 and 7.261. At the same time, the Panel rejected an argument by India that
Article XI only covers ‘ border measures’ in the sense of measures relating to ‘the process of importation’.
In this case, a so-called trade balancing condition (that is, an obligation to export for the same value that
one imports) was found to violate Article XI, although the condition does not relate to the actual ‘process’
of importation and is not enforced at the time of importation. It suﬃced that the condition was a restriction ‘ in relation to importation ’ (Ibid., para. 7.262).
52 This does not necessarily mean that Articles III and XI are mutually exclusive in all respects, i.e.,
that there cannot ever be a measure that is subject to both Article III and Article XI. Indeed, in not a single
GATT or WTO ruling can an explicit statement be found to the eﬀect that the scope of application of
Article III and Article XI is, in all respects, mutually exclusive. In EC – Asbestos, for example, after ﬁnding
a violation of Article III, the panel exercised judicial economy concerning Canada’s claim of violation
under Article XI (Panel report on EC – Asbestos, para. 8.159). In India – Autos, as well, after concluding
that India’s so-called indigenization requirement violates Article III, the panel did not ﬁnd it necessary to
examine the additional US claim of violation under Article XI (Panel report on India – Autos, para. 7.208).
Yet, in both cases the defendant (respectively, the EC and India) considered Articles III and XI to be
mutually exclusive. In EC – Asbestos (para. 8.85) the EC put it thus:
either the measure is an internal regulation, in which case it is covered by Article III:4, or it only
concerns the import of products, in which case it must be assessed in the light of Article XI:1 _a
single measure that applies both to domestic and imported products must necessarily be covered as
a whole by Article III:4 if it is imposed on an imported product at the time or place of importation.
Previous practice in the GATT conﬁrms that there can be no cumulative application with Article XI.
For a similar position, taking the view that its Article XI claim should only be examined in case the panel
ﬁnds that the measure does not fall under Article III, see Panel Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones) – Complaint by Canada, WT/DS48/R/CAN, adopted 13 February 1998,
at para. 4.354 (arguments by Canada), as modiﬁed by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/
DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:II, 235. Yet, especially with the advent of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs), one could imagine that one and the same measure violates both Article XI
and Article III. For example, the trade balancing condition in India – Autos (limiting imports to the value
that one exports) was found to violate Article XI (see supra note 51 and TRIMs Agreement Annex Item
2(a)). In addition, however, it could arguably violate also Article III because the limitation on imports
favors the use of domestic over imported inputs in car manufacturing (see TRIMs Agreement Annex Item
1(b)). As the trade balancing condition only applies to imports, not to domestic products, the Ad Note to
Article III and its corresponding exclusion of Article XI (as depicted in Figure 1 above) do not apply.
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Figure 1. To the extent the Ad Note to Article III directs application of
Article III, Article XI cannot apply
Art. III & Ad Note
(national treatment)

Art. XI (market access)

Preference

in Figure 1 below, where the tinted section depicts measures which the Ad Note
directs fall under Article III, to the exclusion of Article XI. As, from this perspective, Article III gets preference over Article XI, the former is tinted.53
The following examples illustrate this point. Pursuant to the Ad Note a ban on
asbestos, or requirement to label harmful products, falls under Article III if it
applies to both imports and domestic products. If the ban or labeling requirement
is subsequently found to be non-discriminatory and therefore not to violate Article
III, would it not subvert the very existence of the Ad Note to subsequently apply
Article XI and ﬁnd a violation on the simple ground that the measure also bans or
restricts imports ?54 Put diﬀerently, when a trade-related instrument can be qualiﬁed
as a domestic regulation in the sense of Article III and is non-discriminatory both
de jure and de facto, to ﬁnd that it violates Article XI simply because it has the
eﬀect of restricting imports (albeit as much as domestic products) would nullify the
basic distinction made in GATT between border measures, which are strictly regulated, and domestic regulation, where broad regulatory autonomy was reserved.
3.

The smoke screen of the unadopted Tuna – Dolphin panel reports

With the risk of unnecessarily complicating an already complex relation, it is
worth pointing out that in two unadopted and subsequently disregarded panel
reports,55 a peculiar twist was given to the line between Article III and Article XI
Consequently, a violation of both Article III and Article XI could be possible (see Panel Report on
India – Autos, para. 7.296 and footnote 433). However, this is very diﬀerent from making a measure
subject also to Article XI even though, pursuant to the Ad Note, it falls under and does not violate
Article III.
53 Contrast this preference for GATT Article III (domestic regulation) to the preference under GATS
for Article XVI (market access), see infra Figure 3.
54 Although Article XI should not be applied in those two cases, nothing prevents of course that the
TBT or SPS agreements apply. As noted earlier, the SPS and TBT agreements discipline domestic regulations including those that are not discriminatory.
55 See Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp. A recent survey of Article III, albeit focused on tax
measures, does not even mention the Tuna – Dolphin reports, see Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis,
‘Still Hazy after all these Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-Law
on Tax Discrimination’, 15 EJIL (2004), 39.
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measures. With a view to prohibit what were perceived as extraterritorial trade
policies, the Tuna – Dolphin panels (both decided in the 1990s before the WTO’s
establishment) found that the Ad Note to Article III, and hence Article III itself,
only applies to measures that regulate the physical characteristics of the restricted
product as such (in casu, tuna and whether it is, for example, toxic). In the view of
those panels, the Ad Note does not apply, however, to measures that regulate
the way in which the product was processed or produced (in casu, whether or
not it was caught killing dolphins, as was the case in this dispute). The ﬁrst
Tuna-Dolphin panel explained this position as follows:
The Panel noted that the [US tuna restriction] regulates the domestic harvesting
of yellowﬁn tuna to reduce the incidental taking of dolphin, but that these regulations could not be regarded as being applied to tuna products as such because
they would not directly regulate the sale of tuna and could not possibly aﬀect
tuna as a product.56

Consequently, the panel found that the US regulations ‘ did not constitute internal
regulations covered by the Note Ad Article III ’ but rather per se prohibited import
restrictions under Article XI.
Much criticism has been raised against the Tuna-Dolphin panel reports.57 Their
analysis of the relation between GATT Articles III and XI is, however, unlikely to
cross over to WTO jurisprudence, in particular since the latter follows a much
closer interpretation of the text of the treaty terms at issue.58 Indeed, even if the
criterion of a regulation has to do with the way a product was processed or produced (rather than the physical characteristics of the product itself), if the criterion
is not met and the product cannot, therefore, be imported, it is hard to see why,
as the panel found, the measure no longer ‘ applies to an imported product ’ in
the sense of the Ad Note to Article III. The measure still applies to the product
(i.e., the imported tuna is kept out) ; only the reason why it applies diﬀers (physical
characteristic of the product versus a so-called process or production method
or PPM). To say that a speciﬁc type of reason why a regulation applies to a
product means that the regulation itself no longer applies to the product is

56 Panel Report on United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R, unadopted, 3 September
1991, 39S/155, para. 5.14. See also Panel Report on United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
DS29/R, unadopted, 16 June 1994, paras. 5.8–9.
57 See, for example, Robert Howse and Don Regan, ‘ The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory
Basis for Disciplining ‘ Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’, 11 European Journal of International Law (2000),
249–289 and Joost Pauwelyn, ‘ Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms Still Haunt
the WTO’, 15 European Journal of International Law (2004), 575–592.
58 See, for example, Michael Lennard, ‘ Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements’,
Journal of International Economic Law (2002), 17–89. The Tuna – Dolphin panels may, however, be one
of the reasons why the United States in US – Shrimp conceded a violation of Article XI rather than
repeating the argument it made in Tuna – Dophin that Article III (and not Article XI) applies. See supra
note 50. The United States thereby avoided that a WTO panel or the Appellate Body got into the
Tuna – Dolphin question of whether Article III applies to process- or production-related measures, such as
a ban on tuna caught killing dolphin or shrimp killing turtle.
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disingenuous.59 It leads to a drastic per se prohibition of certain types of regulation
solely on the ground of why those regulations are enacted, without any textual
foundation in either Article III or its Ad Note (the words ‘applies to an imported
product ’ are the only terms relied on in the Tuna – Dolphin panels). In addition,
the Appellate Body, in particular in its report on EC – Asbestos, has made it clear
that even regulations that distinguish between products based on factors other than
physical characteristics can be justiﬁed under Article III.60 It did so on the ground
that those factors can make the products ‘ unlike ’ so that treating them diﬀerently
is not discriminatory and the regulation, therefore, complies with Article III.61

3.2 The relationship between Article XVI (market access) and
Articles VI/XVII/XVIII of GATS
1.

Article XVI (market access) versus Article XVII (national treatment)

Compared with GATT, the GATS is even less explicit on the relation between its
market access provision (Article XVI) and its disciplines on domestic regulation
(in particular Articles XVII and VI). More speciﬁcally, GATS has no provision
comparable to the Ad Note to Article III of GATT. In other words, unlike GATT,
the GATS does not state that when a measure aﬀecting trade in services applies to
both foreign and domestic services or service suppliers, Articles XVII on national
treatment must apply, instead of Article XVI on market access.
The reasons for this omission are clear. First, unlike Article XI of GATT, the
scope of Article XVI of GATS includes market access restrictions that apply
equally to foreign and domestic services or service suppliers. Of the six market access
restrictions exhaustively identiﬁed in Article XVI,62 only one has an exclusively
foreign factor, namely limitations on foreign equity participation (Article XVI :2(f)).
The ﬁve other Article XVI market access measures are quantitative restrictions
59 The argument that a process-based measure does not ‘ apply’ to the product because it cannot be
decided upon inspection of the product which product satisﬁes the criteria is unconvincing. Physical
examinations at customs may not be possible. However, certiﬁcation or other inspections in the country of
origin can distinguish between permitted and excluded products (e.g., between shrimp caught with TEDs
and those caught without). The diﬃculty and trustworthiness of such certiﬁcation is another issue.
60 The factors traditionally considered in a ‘ like product’ analysis under Article III are: ‘ (i) the
properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end-uses of the products; (iii) consumers’ tastes and
habits _ and (iv) the tariﬀ classiﬁcation of the product’ (Appellate Body Report on EC – Asbestos, para.
101). Note also that in its very ﬁrst Article III case the Appellate Body rejected the so-called ‘ aims and
eﬀects’ test developed in some earlier GATT cases. Like the Tuna – Dolphin panels, this test focused on
the aim or reason why a regulation was enacted to decide on compliance with Article III. See Appellate
Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R,
adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, 97.
61 That said, the fact that the process-based distinction of the US ban in the Tuna – Dolphin cases
should not have been decisive on the question of whether Article III or Article XI applies, does not
necessarily mean that in those cases the panels should have applied Article III. Based on the speciﬁcs of the
US legislation, in particular whether it could be seen as, in eﬀect, applying equally to imported and
domestic tuna, the panel could still have applied Article XI. Yet, in my view, the fact that the US measure
was based on a process-related distinction was not suﬃcient reason to exclude application of Article III.
62 See supra note 16.
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or limitations on forms of legal entity irrespective of whether these restrictions
apply only to foreign services or service suppliers (discriminatory market access
restrictions) or to both foreign and domestic services and service suppliers
(non-discriminatory market access restrictions). Put diﬀerently, whilst GATT
Article XI only covers discriminatory market access restrictions (e.g., quotas
or bans applying only to imports), GATS Article XVI covers, for example, both a
measure that limits the establishment of foreign banks to ﬁve and a measure that
limits the number of all new banks, be they foreign or domestic, to 10.63
Second, as much as Article XVI is not limited to market access restrictions that
only apply to imports (in contrast to Article XI of GATT), Article XVII is not
limited either to domestic regulations (in contrast to Article III of GATT). Indeed,
for committed sectors, the national treatment obligation in Article XVII applies ‘ in
respect of all measures aﬀecting the supply of services ’. This includes not only
internal regulations applying to both domestic and foreign services or triggered
only once a foreign service supplier has entered the market. It covers also market
access restrictions. Both reasons – in essence, the broad scope of application of
market access and national treatment – can, in turn, be explained by the possibility
to schedule or reserve measures that would otherwise constitute a violation (an
option not provided for in either Article III or XI of GATT). Indeed, with this exit
option in mind, to broadly deﬁne the scope of market access and national treatment must have seemed less threatening.
As a result, there is a complete overlap in the scope of application of Article XVI
(market access) and Article XVII (national treatment) of GATS (to be distinguished
from the overlap in actual violations of the two provisions). As shown in Figure 2,
all Article XVI measures also fall within the scope of application of Article XVII.
This stands in contrast to the, at least partially, mutually exclusive scope of
application of Articles III and XI of GATT, where measures directed by the
Ad Note as falling under Article III (national treatment) cannot also be subject to
Article XI (market access) (see Figure 1 above). Indeed, although in my view
incorrectly, some authors have gone as far as claiming that under GATS the
opposite is true : namely, instead of national treatment prevailing over market
access (as is the case under the Ad Note to GATT Article III), under GATS, once a
measure is covered by Article XVI (market access) it cannot be covered also by
Article XVII (national treatment).64
To illustrate the overlap between Articles XVI and XVII of GATS, a limitation
of ten new banks (whatever their origin) is covered by both Articles XVI and XVII,
with only the former violated. A limitation of ﬁve foreign banks, in contrast, is
covered by, and violates, both Article XVI as a prohibited market access restriction

63 See Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory Note, MTN.GNS/W/164,
3 September 1993, para. 4 and Aaditya Mattoo, ‘National Treatment in the GATS: Corner-stone or
Pandora’s Box?’, 31 Journal of World Trade (1997), 107–135.
64 See infra note 65.
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Figure 2. All Article XVI measures also fall within the scope of application
of Article XVII
Article XVII

Art. XVII (national treatment)
Art. XVI (market access)

and Article XVII as a discriminatory measure aﬀecting the supply of services.
Although, as Figure 2 above shows, all Article XVI measures fall also within the
scope of application of Article XVII, Figure 4 below illustrates that a market access
restriction prohibited under Article XVI can, but does not necessarily, violate also
Article XVII.
The fact that the scope of application of Articles XVI and XVII is not mutually
exclusive is further conﬁrmed in Article XX :2 of GATS. It provides that
[m]easures inconsistent with both Articles XVI and XVII shall be inscribed in the
column relating to Article XVI. In this case the inscription will be considered to
provide a condition or qualiﬁcation to Article XVII as well.

In other words, if a WTO Member wants to maintain the above referenced
limitation on the establishment of foreign banks to ﬁve, where it made both a
market access and national treatment commitment in the banking sector, that
Member must inscribe the limitation in its schedule. Moreover, it will suﬃce to do
so in the column relating to Article XVI. There is no need to repeat the limitation
in the Article XVII column.65
65 Some authors have deduced a much broader priority rule from this Article XX:2 provision on
scheduling. They argue that, based on Article XX:2, Articles XVI and XVII are mutually exclusive in the
sense that Article XVII (national treatment) should only apply to measures that do not fall under Article
XVI (market access) or, in other words, that preference must be given to Article XVI over Article XVII:
Consequently, measures falling within the scope of market access would – even if they were
discriminatory – only fall within the scope of Article XVI and would be excluded from the scope of
national treatment. In this case Article XVII would only cover discriminatory measures other than
restrictions to market access. A member who remained unbound concerning market access would
be allowed to introduce discriminatory quantitative restrictions or other limitations within the
scope of Article XVI, because they would be excluded from the scope of Article XVII (Krajewski,
supra note 15, at 115. See also Mattoo, supra note 63, at 116).
Two arguments counter this position of mutual exclusiveness between Articles XVI and XVII. First, and
most importantly, as noted earlier, Article XVII explicitly states that it covers ‘all measures aﬀecting the
supply of services’. This, apparently, includes quantitative restrictions subject also to Article XVI. Second,
the fact that Article XX :2 expands the reservation of a discriminatory measure under a Member’s market
access column to a reservation also under its national treatment column conﬁrms, rather than rejects, that
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As applied to the Gambling dispute, for example, even if the US gambling laws
at issue were to be construed as market access restrictions under Article XVI (a
ﬁnding disputed below), such would not preclude the additional application of
Article XVII. Put diﬀerently, the US gambling laws could, in theory, be both
market access restrictions (say, limit the number of suppliers of certain gambling
services contrary to Article XVI :2(a)) and discriminate against foreign suppliers of
gambling services as compared with like US suppliers of gambling services (contrary to Article XVII). In this sense, a panel can cumulatively apply Articles XVI
and XVII of GATS to one and the same measure (see Figure 2 above) even if,
importantly, only a commitment was made on national treatment and none on
market access.66 This is what Antigua asked for. 67 However, after ﬁnding a violation of Article XVI of GATS, the Panel decided to exercise judicial economy in
respect of Antigua’s national treatment claim under Article XVII.68 On appeal, the
Appellate Body did not address Article XVII at all. Yet, the ultimate and only
reason why it faulted the US gambling laws was one of discrimination, not pursuant to Article XVII, but pursuant to the chapeau of the Article XIV exceptions.69
In addition, even if the US gambling laws were found to be non-discriminatory
pursuant to Article XVII, such would not, in principle, preclude them from being
market access restrictions in violation of Article XVI (quod non). As noted earlier,
unlike Article XI of GATT, Article XVI of GATS also covers measures that apply
to both foreign and domestic services (e.g., a limit of 10 new banks). Hence, even if
a measure is justiﬁed as non-discriminatory under Article XVII, it can still be found
to violate Article XVI. As Figure 4 below illustrates, some measures may conform
to Article XVII but violate Article XVI.

there can be overlap between the two articles. Moreover, to say, as Article XX :2 does, that a speciﬁc
measure explicitly mentioned and reserved in a market access column can no longer violate Article XVII, is
one thing; to say that the absence of commitments under Article XVI means that not a single quantitative
restriction can therefore violate Article XVII, quite another. In the ﬁrst case, other WTO Members,
through the reservation under the market access column and Article XX:2, were fully aware that the
speciﬁc measure would be maintained. The reservation of a speciﬁc discriminatory measure in a Member’s
schedule could, in that case, be regarded as a lex specialis prevailing over the general prohibition on
discrimination in Article XVII. In the second case, however, given a full commitment of non-discrimination under Article XVII, WTO Members were entitled not to expect discriminatory measures, including
discriminatory quantitative restrictions, even if no commitment was made to an outright ban on all
quantitative restrictions (under Article XVI). In that situation, it is hard to construe the absence of commitments on market access as a lex specialis prevailing over an explicit commitment not to discriminate. If
anything, it is rather the commitment not to discriminate (under Article XVII) that should prevail as lex
specialis over the more general non-commitment on market access (under Article XVI). The normatively
neutral objective of ‘ legal certainty’ that comes with two provisions being mutually exclusive, referred to
by Krajewski (supra note 15, at 115), can hardly overcome the combined weight of those two arguments.
66 Contrast this to the position referred to, and rejected, supra note 65, which states that, if a measure
falls under Article XVI and no commitments were made under that provision, then Article XVII can no
longer apply.
67 Panel Report on US – Gambling, para. 6.422.
68 Ibid., para. 6.426.
69 See supra note 5.
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Article XVI (market access) versus Article XVIII (additional commitments)

In contrast to the interaction between market access and national treatment in
GATS, the relationship between Article XVI (market access) and Article XVIII
(additional commitments) of GATS excludes all overlap. Article XVIII itself makes
it explicit that additional commitments inscribed in a Member’s schedule pursuant
to Article XVIII70 can only cover ‘ measures aﬀecting trade in services not subject to
scheduling under Articles XVI or XVII ’. This is illustrated in Figure 4 below where
Article XVIII violations do not overlap with violations under either Articles XVI or
XVII.
3.

Article XVI (market access) versus Article VI (domestic regulation)

Most importantly for present purposes, the GATS does not explicitly regulate how
Article XVI (market access) and Article VI (domestic regulation) interact. Some
degree of overlap between these two provisions is, however, implied. Article VI :1,
for example, covers ‘ all measures of general application aﬀecting trade in
services ’, thereby apparently including market access restrictions ‘of general
application ’ covered also by Article XVI. Articles VI:2 and VI:3, in turn, impose
obligations, respectively, for ‘ administrative decisions aﬀecting trade in services ’
and situations where ‘ authorization is required for the supply of a service ’. Both
provisions would thus seem to cover also certain market access restrictions, or
decisions pursuant thereto, that are already covered by Article XVI of GATS.
As a result, one and the same measure (or administration/application of it) can
fall under, and violate, both Article XVI and Article VI :1–3 of GATS, as illustrated
in Figure 4 below. In the Gambling case, for example, Antigua requested such
cumulative application in respect of the US gambling laws at issue, arguing that
they violate both Article XVI as market access restrictions and Articles VI :1 and
3 on the ground that the US laws are, inter alia, not ‘ administered in a reasonable,
objective and impartial manner ’.71 However, after ﬁnding a violation of Article
XVI of GATS, the Panel decided that ‘ Antigua has not made a prima facie demonstration that the measures at issue are inconsistent with Articles VI :1 and
VI :3’.72 On appeal, the Appellate Body did not address Article VI at all.
The relation between Article XVI and the more substantive parts of Article VI,
namely paragraphs 4 and 5 relating to ‘ qualiﬁcation requirements and procedures,
technical standards and licensing requirements ’ (hereafter ‘ QTL requirements ’),73
is diﬀerent. It is this relationship that is at the core of the Gambling dispute and
underlies the basic argument of this paper.
Market access restrictions are ‘ maximum limitations’ that regulate ‘ quantity’,
QTL requirements are ‘ minimum requirements ’ that regulate ‘ quality’
70 For an example, see supra note 19.
71 Panel Report on US – Gambling, para. 6.427–428.
72 Ibid., para. 6.437.
73 See supra text at notes 21–23.
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Focusing exclusively on the quantitative restrictions under Article XVI 74, the rule
of thumb to distinguish Article XVI from Article VI :4/5 measures is that the former relate to the quantity or number of either services or service suppliers (Article
XVI), the latter to the quality of the service or the ability of the service supplier
(Article VI :4/5). Both parties in the Gambling dispute agreed with this distinction
and accept that qualitative restrictions are not covered by Article XVI.75
The Appellate Body, in turn, conﬁrmed that ‘ the focus of Article XVI :2(a) is on
limitations relating to numbers or, put diﬀerently, to quantitative limitations’.76
As the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines put it (also quoted by the Gambling panel and
conﬁrmed by the Appellate Body to be ‘ supplementary means of interpretation ’ of
the GATS) :77
The quantitative restrictions [in Article XVI] can be expressed numerically, or
through the criteria speciﬁed in subparagraphs (a) to (d); these criteria do not
relate to the quality of the service supplied, or to the ability of the supplier to
supply the service (i.e. technical standards or qualiﬁcation of the supplier).78

Put more neutrally, that is, completely detached from the regulatory purpose or intent of the measure concerned, Article XVI restrictions impose
‘ maximum limitations’ that cannot be overcome by any action of the supplier
(e.g., under a measure limiting new banks to ten, a bank cannot establish itself
once the quota of 10 is ﬁlled, whatever the bank does). In contrast to such
‘ maximum limitation ’, Article VI :4/5 measures impose ‘ minimum requirements ’ ;
that is, they condition entry on speciﬁc requirements whose fulﬁllment is, in
theory, in the hands of the service supplier (e.g., a minimum capitalization
requirement to obtain a banking license can, in theory, be met by any bank as long
as it has the money).79

74 This makes abstraction of the limitations on forms of legal entity and foreign equity participation
also covered by Article XVI (in paragraphs (e) and (f)).
75 Ibid., para. 6.327.
76 Appellate Body Report on US – Gambling, para 255 and, also para. 248.
77 Ibid., para. 196 (pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). The
Appellate Body did, however, reject the panel’s earlier conclusion that the 1993 and 2001 Guidelines are
either ‘context’ or ‘subsequent practice’ (or both) in the sense of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
(ibid., paras. 178 and 193). The diﬀerence is that the Guidelines as ‘ supplementary means’ can now only
be referred to in case the meaning of the GATS provision in question remains ambiguous or leads to absurd
results after interpretation pursuant to Article 31.
78 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 30, at para. 4. Repeated also in Guidelines for the
Scheduling of Speciﬁc Commitments Under the GATS, adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 23
March 2001, S/L/92 (hereafter ‘Revised Scheduling Guidelines of 2001’) at p. 4.
79 See 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 30, at para. 5 : ‘the quantitative restrictions speciﬁed in
subparagraphs (a) to (d) refer to maximum limitations. Minimum requirements such as those common
to licensing requirements (e.g. minimum capital requirements for the establishment of a corporate entity)
do not fall within the scope of Article XVI’. The exception to this rule is Article XVI:2(e) which refers
to requirements as to the legal form of service suppliers.
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The relevant parts of the two Article XVI deﬁnitions at issue in the Gambling
dispute (paragraphs 2(a) and (c)) make the quantitative nature of Article XVI
restrictions abundantly clear :
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers _ in the form of numerical
quotas _
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total number
of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the
form of quotas _
Although the GATS itself does not deﬁne the meaning of QTL requirements under
Article VI, the WTO Secretariat clariﬁed that they regulate quality rather than
quantity : Qualiﬁcation requirements, ‘normally relate to matters such as
education, examination requirements, practical training, experience or language
requirements ’,80 ensuring the quality of the service provider. Licensing requirements ‘ are substantive requirements, other than qualiﬁcation requirements, with
which a service supplier is required to comply in order to obtain formal permission
to supply a service ’. Such licensing requirements are stated to include ‘ residency
requirements, fees, establishment requirements, registration requirements, etc. ’.
Technical standards, ﬁnally, ‘ are requirements which may apply both to the
characteristics or deﬁnition of the service itself and to the manner in which it is
performed ’.
This dividing line between quantity/maximum limitations (Article XVI)
and quality/minimum requirements (Article VI :4/5) goes back to the aboveexplained rationale for the basic distinction in both GATT and GATS between
market access and domestic regulation. The former can be presumed to be
protectionist, since they are only applied to imports (such as import quotas
under Article XI of GATT) or impose a purely numerical ceiling on whether
(more) services can be supplied in the ﬁrst place (say, a limit on the establishment
of ﬁve foreign banks, or ten new banks whatever their origin, which, on its face,
is a blatant protection of existing banks).81 Domestic regulation, in contrast,

80 Note by the Secretariat, The Relevance of the Disciplines of the Agreements on Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT) and on Import Licensing Procedures to Article VI.4 of the GATS, S/WPPS/W/9, 11
September 1996, para. 4. See also Note by the Secretariat, Article VI:4 of the GATS: Disciplines on
Domestic Regulation Applicable to All Services, S/C/W/96, 1 March 1999, para. 4.
81 At the same time, unlike the more uniform group of prohibitions and quotas covered by GATT
Article XI, it must be pointed out that the six market access restrictions in GATS Article XVI are unlikely
to be equivalent in their welfare consequences. As Alan Sykes points out, limitations on the total number
of services ‘ probably have deadweight costs quite analogous to those associated with quotas in goods
markets’ (Alan Sykes, ‘ ‘‘Eﬃcient Protection’’ through WTO Rulemaking’, in Roger Porter, Pierre Sauve,
Arvind Subramanian, and Americao Zampetti (eds), Eﬃciency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral
Trading System at the Millennium (Brookings Institution: 2001), 114 at 129. However, limitations on the
employment of natural persons or requirements to establish a joint venture may have additional types of
deadweight costs (respectively, ineﬃcient shift toward capital-intensive technology for service provision
and increases in marginal costs of production due to the obligation to team up with nationals of the host
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is presumed to serve a legitimate, non-protectionist purpose, be it consumer
protection, safety, or public order. With the exception of blanket bans (on, for
example, asbestos or cocaine, both for health reasons), in most cases, domestic
regulation assumes that products or services can have market access (they are not
per se prohibited) and regulates rather how this can be done (e.g., only faceto-face, not remote gambling is permitted). As a result, domestic regulation,
in principle, violates trade rules only when it discriminates against imports82 or
when it is, for example, more trade restrictive than necessary to meet its stated
legitimate objective.83
QLT requirements remain subject also to market access disciplines

Notwithstanding the distinctions set out above, based on the text of GATS,
one cannot preclude that QTL requirements governed by Article VI may also be
market access restrictions prohibited in Article XVI (remember, GATS has nothing
similar to the Ad Note to Article III of GATT). For example, a licensing requirement could take the form of a prohibited Article XVI measure such as an economic
needs test (Article XVI :2(a)) or a requirement that the licensee establish a joint
venture (Article XVI :2(e)).
The 1993 and 2001 (Revised) Scheduling Guidelines clearly describe Article
XVI as a provision that continues to apply notwithstanding Article VI :4/5.84
The 2001 Guidelines put it as follows:
Approval procedures or licensing and qualiﬁcation requirements _ are frequently
stipulated as conditions to obtain a license _ they [should not] be scheduled
under Article XVI as long as they do not contain any of the limitations speciﬁed in
Article XVI. However _ [i]f approval procedures or licensing and qualiﬁcation

country). In contrast, other market access restrictions may be less harmful and imposed for reasons other
than protectionism, such as technological limits in the case of limiting the number of providers of audiovisual services. Yet, unlike GATT, which promotes eﬃcient protection by favoring tariﬀ protection over
quotas and, in turn, quotas over discriminatory regulation (see supra notes 10 and 11), GATS Articles XVI
and XVII treat all market access limitations equally, and do not distinguish between market access restrictions and discriminatory regulation, nor between types of discriminatory regulation (e.g., taxes versus
other forms of regulation). As Sykes argues, GATS could do more to channel remaining or permitted
protectionism of services industries toward the policy instrument that is most eﬃcient, i.e., least harmful.
82 Article III of GATT and Article XVII of GATS.
83 Under SPS Article 5.6, TBT Article 2.2 or Article VI:4/5 of GATS. The measure may also be WTO
inconsistent for deviation from an international standard without justiﬁcation (pursuant to SPS Art. 3 or
TBT Article 2.4). As stated in a Note by the WTO Secretariat, supra note 80, para. 3:
Measures falling within the scope of Article VI.4. are intended to serve regulatory or other public
policy objectives. Their purpose is not to restrict trade, and if they have incidental restrictive eﬀects
on trade, Article VI requires that these eﬀects should be the minimum compatible with achievement
of the desired policy objective. _ By contrast, measures intended to restrict trade and/or to
discriminate between national and foreign suppliers are dealt with under Article XVI, Article XVII
and the Annex on Article II Exemptions’. (emphasis added)
84 On the interpretative role of these Guidelines, see supra note 77.
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requirements contain any of the limitations speciﬁed in Article XVI, they should
be scheduled as market access limitations.85

Therefore, unlike GATT, where most, if not all, domestic regulation cannot be
subjected to market access disciplines (to the extent the Ad Note calls for application of Article III, it does so to the exclusion of Article XI), under GATS, where
both market access and domestic regulation are broadly deﬁned and, as a result,
tend to overlap, domestic regulation subject to, and in compliance with, Article
VI :4/5 remains subject also to the market access disciplines in Article XVI. In case
a WTO Member wants to maintain an Article XVI restriction it must (for committed services) schedule that restriction. A prohibition under Article XVI cannot
be cured by Article VI :4/5.
Some would go even further and claim that once a measure falls under Article
XVI, it can no longer be subject to Article VI :4/5.86 If so, the two provisions would
be mutually exclusive with a preference for market access (in stark contrast to the
GATT where, to the extent the Ad Note applies, preference is given to rules on
domestic regulation over those on market access). This is actually what the
Gambling panel found.87 Yet, no textual support exists for such mutual exclusiveness and nothing in the current GATS precludes that Article VI :4/5 applies in
addition to Article XVI.88 In an apparent attempt to move away from this panel
ﬁnding, the Appellate Body stated that ‘[i]t is neither necessary nor appropriate
for us to draw, in the abstract, the line between quantitative [Article XVI] and
85 2001 Revised Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 78, at p. 4, emphasis added. Or, as the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines phrase it:
if the criteria for granting licenses or approval [referred to in Article VI:4] contain a market access
restriction (e.g. economic needs test) or discriminatory treatment, the relevant measures would
need to be scheduled if a Member wishes to maintain them as limitations under Article XVI or XVII
(1993 Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 30, at p. 1, emphasis added).
86 See Panel Report on US – Gambling, para. 6.305 and, for example, Laurel Terry, ‘But What Will
the WTO Disciplines Apply to? Distinguishing Among Market Access, National Treatment and Article
VI:4 Measures When Applying the GATS to Legal Services’, The Professional Lawyer (2004), 83, at 98
(‘Article VI :4 measures that might be the subject of Disciplines are those measures that are neither ‘market
access’ nor ‘ national treatment’ measures, nor subject to any other provision in the GATS, on the other
hand’).
87 Panel Report on US – Gambling, para. 6.305 (‘Under Article VI and Article XVI, measures
are either of the type covered by the disciplines of Article XVI or are domestic regulations relating to
qualiﬁcation requirements and procedures, technical standards, and licensing requirements subject to the
speciﬁc provisions of Article VI. Thus, Articles VI :4 and VI :5, on the one hand, and XVI, on the other
hand, are mutually exclusive’).
88 Although the panel acknowledged that ‘the GATS does not explicitly address the relationship
between Article XVI and VI’ (at para. 6.307), it found suﬃcient support for mutual exclusiveness in two
quotes from the 1993 and 2001 (Revised) Scheduling Guidelines (supra notes 30 and 78). However, the
ﬁrst quote (at para. 6.307) does nothing more than conﬁrm that the two articles are diﬀerent. It says
nothing about mutual exclusiveness. The second quote (at para. 6.308) is limited to the Accountancy
Disciplines or, at the most, to future disciplines to be developed under Article VI :4. It does not explicitly
address the present interaction between Articles XVI and VI:5.
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qualitative [Article VI] measures, and we do not do so here ’.89 Indeed, only the
1998 Accountancy Disciplines, so far the only Article VI :4 disciplines developed
by the GATS Council, provide for mutual exclusiveness with Articles XVI and
XVII. Paragraph 1 of these Disciplines explicitly states that they
do not address measures subject to scheduling under Articles XVI and XVII of the
GATS _ Such measures are addressed in the GATS through the negotiation and
scheduling of speciﬁc commitments.90

Following the example of additional commitments under Article XVIII of GATS91,
any measure that is a market access restriction speciﬁed in Article XVI is, therefore, not covered by the Accountancy Disciplines. As a result, the scope of application of Article XVI and the Accountancy Disciplines is mutually exclusive in the
sense that if a measure is covered by Article XVI it cannot be covered also by
the Accountancy Disciplines. In the absence of such explicit provision, the same
cannot be said about the relation between Article XVI and Article VI :4/5 more
generally.
Whether or not GATS disciplines on market access and domestic regulation are
mutually exclusive can have tremendous importance. If, on the one hand, Article
XVI always applies to the exclusion of Article VI:4/5, then a measure scheduled
as a reserved market access restriction under Article XVI is home free and cannot
be scrutinized under any additional Article VI:4/5 disciplines. If, on the other
hand, Articles XVI and VI :4/5 can, in certain cases, overlap, then even a measure
scheduled as reserved under Article XVI could, in theory, still be found to violate
GATS because it is, for example, more burdensome than necessary under Article
VI :4/5 disciplines. In the latter situation, a conﬂict could arise between an explicit
permission under Article XVI and a prohibition under Article VI:4/5.92
89 Appellate Body Report on US – Gambling, para. 250.
90 Paragraph 1, Accountancy Disciplines, supra note 21. Attachment 4 to the 2001 Revised Scheduling
Guidelines (supra note 78, at p. 28), entitled ‘ Discussion of Matters Relating to Articles XVI and XVII of
GATS in Connection with the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, Informal
Note by the Chairman’, clariﬁes this position as follows:
It was observed that the new disciplines developed under Article VI :4 must not overlap with other
provisions already existing in the GATS, including Articles XVI and XVII, as this would create
legal uncertainty _ the disciplines to be developed under Article VI :4 cover domestic regulatory
measures which are not regarded as market access restrictions as such _
91 See supra text at note 70.
92 On the need for a wide deﬁnition of conﬂict, see Pauwelyn, supra note 39, at 184–8. To resolve such
conﬂict, one argument could be that the explicit scheduling of the measure under Article XVI prevails as
lex specialis over the more general rules in Article VI:4/5. Indeed, at this stage, awaiting further disciplines,
Article VI:4/5 can, in any event, not be violated: given that the measure was explicitly scheduled, it must
be presumed to be reasonably expected by other WTO Members pursuant to Article VI :5(a)(ii) (see the
discussion infra text at note 128). On the other hand, once the GATS Council has developed more detailed
Article VI:4 disciplines, one could argue that the prohibition under those disciplines prevails as lex
posterior (and arguably also as lex specialis) over the permission under Article XVI. Note that no provision similar to Article XX:2 is at work in this respect. Pursuant to Article XX:2, a measure scheduled
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Figure 3. To the extent Articles VI :4/5 and XVI overlap, a prohibition
under Article XVI prevails
Art. VI:4/5 (domestic regulation)

Art. XVI (market access)

Preference

Given those uncertainties, GATS negotiators would be well-advised to follow
the example of the Accountancy Disciplines and explicitly regulate, in whatever
way they deem appropriate,93 the interaction between future Article VI :4
disciplines and Article XVI.
Market access restrictions are, and must be, narrowly deﬁned

To give preference to market access disciplines over those on domestic regulation,
as is currently done in the relation between Articles XVI and VI:4/5 of GATS,
poses one serious threat. The risk is that the per se prohibition of market access
restrictions under Article XVI encroaches on the regulatory autonomy of WTO
Members to set domestic regulation. Indeed, under GATT, the priority rule is the
exact opposite. There, to avoid the per se prohibition under Article XI, Article III
on domestic regulation largely applies to the exclusion of Article XI (see Figure 1
above) and further SPS/TBT disciplines on domestic regulation prevail over

under Article XVI also counts as a reservation under Article XVII. The GATS is, however, silent about its
eﬀect under Article VI.
93 The advantage of carving out Article XVI measures (and discriminatory measures in violation of
Article XVII) from the scope of application of future Article VI :4 disciplines is legal certainty, in particular, peace of mind for those WTO Members who scheduled measures otherwise in violation of Articles
XVI or XVII. On the other hand, the case could be made that also Article XVI/XVII measures, even if
reserved for their quantitative limitation/discrimination in a Member’s Article XVI/XVII column, must be
subject to further disciplines under Article VI :4 for other aspects. If the relation between the GATT and
the SPS/TBT agreements (compared earlier to future disciplines under Article VI :4) is to oﬀer any guidance, SPS and TBT provisions apply in addition to, and cumulatively with, the GATT. Moreover, a Note
to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement provides that, in the event of conﬂict between the two, SPS/TBT
provisions prevail over those in GATT (General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the WTO). On the relation between GATT and SPS/TBT, see Pauwelyn, supra
note 13. In addition, to carve out all market access restrictions from Article VI :4 disciplines (as the
Accountancy Disciplines do), even those that were not scheduled or committed and can hence be freely
imposed, may oﬀer too much leeway for protectionism by means of market access restrictions, including
possibly circumvention of Article VI :4 disciplines through Article XVI measures. At the same time, since
many market access restrictions are less costly and more transparent than unnecessary and wasteful
regulation, such preference for Article XVI could also be seen as steering WTO Members toward the most
eﬃcient instrument of protection (the way GATT steers protection in the goods sector toward tariﬀs). See
supra note 81.
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GATT.94 However, to mitigate this risk, and to give eﬀect to the preamble of GATS
(which explicitly reserves ‘ the right of Members to regulate, and to introduce new
regulation, on the supply of services within their territories, in order to meet
national policy objectives ’) the types of market access restrictions per se prohibited
under Article XVI were narrowly drafted, and must continue to be narrowly deﬁned. Put diﬀerently, a contextual interpretation of Article XVI, in the light of
Article VI and the GATS preamble, should only apply Article XVI when the
measure in question is clearly and explicitly covered as prohibited under Article
XVI.
In contrast, the Appellate Body, in its interpretation of Article XVI in Gambling,
did not make any reference at all either to Article VI or to the GATS preamble on
domestic regulation. Focusing almost exclusively on the text of Article XVI in
isolation, it thereby completely ignored the delicate balance, both in GATT and
GATS, between market access and domestic regulation.95
At the same time, the Gambling Panel did conﬁrm two important limitations
under Article XVI. First, the list of six types of measures in Article XVI :2 is
an exhaustive one.96 If a measure does not fall within one of those six deﬁnitions, it
is not a prohibited market access restriction, even if in eﬀect it restricts market
access. Second, also the elaborations in each of the six deﬁnitions are exhaustive.97
In particular, limitations on the number of service suppliers are only prohibited
if they take the form of (i) ‘ numerical quotas ’, (ii) ‘ monopolies ’, (iii) ‘exclusive
service suppliers ’, or (iv) ‘ the requirements of an economic needs test ’. Equally,
limitations on the total number of service operations are only prohibited if
‘ expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the
requirement of an economic needs test ’.98 Any other limitations on the number of
service suppliers or service operations are not per se prohibited.
The mere fact that domestic regulation has the eﬀect of restricting the number of
imports does not make it a market access restriction

Whilst the Gambling panel thereby rightly conﬁrmed two limitations under Article
XVI, it overlooked another one. This other limitation relates to one of the basic
claims in this paper, namely: Domestic regulation, in particular qualiﬁcation,
technical, or licensing (QTL) requirements subject to Article VI :4/5, cannot be
found to violate Article XVI as a market access restriction simply because their

94 See also supra note 93.
95 Appellate Body Report on US – Gambling, paras. 223–252. The only non-textual element referred
to by the Appellate Body are two examples of Article XVI measures mentioned in the 1993 Guidelines.
Ibid., para. 237 (nationality requirements) and para. 249 (restrictions on broadcasting time), discussed
infra text at note 121.
96 Panel on US – Gambling, para. 6.298. The list can be found supra note 16.
97 Ibid., paras. 6.325 and 6.341.
98 The Appellate Body left the question of whether this refers to two or three types of limitations open
(ibid., para. 247).
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substantive regulation also quantitatively restricts market access for services or
service suppliers that do not meet the requirement.99
The following example illustrates this point. If a country requires taxi drivers to
pass a driving test, the mere fact that this test keeps taxi drivers that do not pass the
test oﬀ the market does not make the requirement a market access restriction
contrary to Article XVI. This is exactly why Article XVI only prohibits certain
formal types of limitations on the number of services or service suppliers, e.g, only
those ‘ in the form of numerical quotas ’ or ‘expressed in terms of designated
numerical units in the form of quotas ’. Mere quantitative eﬀect is not enough. By
ﬁnding otherwise,100 the Appellate Body eﬀectively read the words ‘ form ’ and
‘numerical ’ out of Article XVI. Yet, those words were included with a speciﬁc
purpose, namely to limit the per se prohibition in Article XVI to explicitly
numerical quotas (which, as purely quantitative limits, can be presumed to be
protectionist), whilst leaving other non-discriminatory domestic regulations
(which can be presumed to serve a legitimate purpose unless proven otherwise) for
future negotiations under Article VI.
At this juncture, the relation between Articles VI and XVI of GATS bears similarities with that between Articles III and XI of GATT. As much as the asbestos
ban, car safety standard or labeling requirement discussed earlier, all of which
apply to both domestic and imported products, does not become a prohibited
quantitative restriction under Article XI for the sole reason that it also bans or
restricts imported asbestos, cars or non-labeled products, equally, a domestic
regulation, related to the quality of a service or the ability of its supplier, does not
become a prohibited market access restriction under Article XVI simply because it
has the eﬀect of restricting the number of services or service suppliers that can
access the market.
To paraphrase the GATT Panel on Canada – Administration of the Foreign
Investment Review Act quoted earlier,101 if Article XVI of GATS were interpreted
so broadly as to cover also the quantitative eﬀects of domestic regulation, Article
VI :4/5 of GATS would be superﬂuous. Indeed, if, following the reasoning of the
Appellate Body in Gambling, Article XVI were to include domestic regulation

99 As the Panel on US – Gambling (at para. 6.304) itself noted:
Domestic regulations falling within the scope of Articles VI :4 or VI :5 of the GATS are _ likely to
have an eﬀect on market access to the extent that services and service suppliers from other WTO
Members which do not, or cannot, comply with such regulations will not have access to the
relevant Member’s market. Yet, non-discriminatory measures relating to, for instance, the quality
of the service supplied or the ability of the supplier to supply the service _ can be maintained
provided that they conform to criteria to be developed by the Council for Trade in Services
pursuant to Article VI :4 and, in the meantime, to the criteria contained in Article VI :5.
100 Appellate Body Report on US – Gambling, para. 238 (‘we are of the view that limitations [in casu,
a qualitative limitation on gambling, i.e., a ban on remote gambling] amounting to a zero quota are
quantitative limitations and fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a)’) and para. 251.
101 See supra note 43.
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Figure 4. Potential combinations of GATS violations102

simply because it also has the eﬀect of quantitatively restricting the number of
services or suppliers that can enter the market, then most domestic regulation
would already be prohibited by Article XVI, unless it can be justiﬁed under
the limited exceptions of Articles XIV and XIVbis. If so, why bother negotiating
further disciplines under Article VI :4 ?

4. Applying the distinction to US – Gambling
Applying the above-explained dividing line between Article XVI
restrictions (quantity/maximum limitation) and Article VI :4/5 regulation (quality/
minimum requirement), the US gambling laws at issue in the US – Gambling
dispute were better deﬁned as technical standards subject to Articles VI :4/5
and XVII. They are not market access restrictions per se prohibited under
Article XVI.

102 Figure 4 assumes that the services sector at issue is fully committed under both Articles XVI and
XVII. It is also crucially diﬀerent from Figure 2: Figure 2 depicts the overlapping scope of application of
Articles XVI and XVII; Figure 4 depicts potential overlapping violations of GATS provisions (e.g., the fact
that all Article XVI measures also fall within the scope of application of Article XVII, see Figure 2, does
not mean that all Article XVI measures necessarily violate Article XVII).
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The US laws are domestic regulations that, on their face, apply to both foreign
and US providers and are imposed in relation to the quality of the service supplied.
They regulate how certain gambling services must be performed, namely by prohibiting their remote supply. They do so to fulﬁll domestic policy objectives that
are, on their face (and as conﬁrmed by the Appellate Body),103 not protectionist,
namely : concerns of money laundering, fraud, organized crime, and compulsive
and under-age gambling. Put more neutrally, and irrespective of their purported
regulatory purpose or intent, the US laws do not put a maximum limitation
on gambling services in the United States. Rather, they impose minimum
requirements as to how those services must be supplied.104 As the WTO Secretariat
pointed out:
[technical] standards in the area of trade in services apply not only to the technical characteristics of the service itself _ but also to the rules according to
which the service must be performed.105

This is exactly what the US gambling laws do : They regulate the way in which
gambling services must be performed, namely in what one could call an
‘inter-personal’ or ‘ face-to-face ’ manner (the ﬂipside of the prohibition on remote
supply). The US laws do so to ensure the quality of the service, in particular to
keep minors from gambling so as to protect their health and to protect the wider
public order and morality of the United States against fraud and compulsive
gambling.
Crucially, the fact that this technical standard of face-to-face supply leads to the
prohibition of certain types of supply that do not meet the standard (e.g., the
remote supply of gambling), does not transform the technical standard into a
market access restriction contrary to Article XVI. As pointed out earlier, as much
as a ban on both imported and domestic asbestos, or driving test for taxi drivers,
does not become a prohibited quantitative restriction106 for the sole reason that it
also bans imported asbestos or keeps oﬀ the market aspiring taxi drivers that do
not pass the driving test. Equally a domestic regulation prescribing how gambling
services must be performed does not become a prohibited market access restriction
103 Appellate Body Report on US – Gambling, para. 327 (ﬁnding that the US laws before it are
‘measures _ necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order’, within the meaning of
paragraph (a) of Article XIV of the GATS).
104 That is, the US laws condition the supply of gambling services on speciﬁc requirements (i.e., faceto-face or inter-personal supply) whose fulﬁllment is, in theory, in the hands of the service supplier (the
way a minimum capital requirement to obtain a banking license can, in theory, be met by any bank as long
as it has the money). Indeed, like US suppliers, Antigua suppliers can supply gambling services in the
United States as long as they do so face-to-face.
105 Supra note 80, para. 18. The WTO Secretariat adds, ‘[t]his distinction [between technical
characteristics of the service itself and rules on how the service must be performed] is akin to that made in
the TBT between product standards and standards relating to production and process methods’.
On production and process methods and their coverage under GATT and TBT, see supra text at notes
55 to 61.
106 Respectively, under GATT Article XI and GATS Article XVI.
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simply because it has the eﬀect of restricting the number of services or service
suppliers that can supply the US market (i.e., because it prohibits those not meeting
the technical standard).
Yet, it is exactly in this trap that both the Gambling Panel and Appellate Body
fell. Even before going into the precise deﬁnitions of the six restrictions set out in
Article XVI, the Panel had already made up its mind that the US laws are prohibited market access restrictions simply because they have the eﬀect of a prohibition on certain cross-border supplies of gambling services. At paragraphs 6.285–6
the Panel found :
Accordingly, where a full market access commitment has been made for mode 1
[cross-border supply], a prohibition on one, several or all means of delivery
included in this mode 1 would be a limitation on market access for the mode
[under Article XVI] _ If a Member desires to exclude market access with respect
to the supply of a service through one, several or all means of delivery included in
mode 1, it should do so explicitly in its schedule.107

If this were correct, any domestic service regulation would become a market access
restriction simply because it implies ‘ a prohibition on one, several or all means of
delivery’ of a committed mode of trade in services, irrespective of whether the
regulation falls under one of the six deﬁnitions of Article XVI. This, of course,
contradicts the Panel’s own ﬁnding that ‘the list of limitations in paragraph 2 of
Article XVI is exhaustive ’.108 As Markus Krajewski put it :
A measure which cannot be subsumed under one of the categories mentioned in
Article XVI:2 is not prohibited by Article XVI, even if it eﬀectively restricts
market access (‘de facto market access restriction ’).109

On appeal, the Appellate Body wisely side-stepped this panel ﬁnding110 and focused
instead on the wording of Articles XVI :2(a) and (c). Yet, it interpreted those
provisions in complete isolation of Article VI and the GATS preamble on domestic
regulation. Nor did it make any reference whatsoever to the dividing line, so crucial
under both GATS and GATT, between market access and domestic regulation.111
107 This ﬁnding is repeated almost verbatim in the ﬁnal conclusions of the panel (Panel Report, para.
7.2) without further attention to the speciﬁc deﬁnitions in Article XVI. Those deﬁnitions are dealt with in
paras. 6.319–355 of the report, but each time the ultimate reason for ﬁnding that the US laws are Article
XVI measures is based on the much earlier ﬁnding in paras. 6.285–286 just quoted.
108 Panel Report on US – Gambling, para. 6.298.
109 Krajewski, supra note 15, at 84. See also John Jackson, William Davey, and Alan Sykes, Legal
Problems of International Economic Relations (St Paul, MN: West Group, 2002), 890 (Article XVI
‘focuses on the form of measures, not on their eﬀect’, emphasis in original).
110 Appellate Body Report on US – Gambling, para. 220.
111 The Appellate Body stated that ‘ [i]t is neither necessary nor appropriate for us to draw, in the
abstract, the line between quantitative [Article XVI] and qualitative [Article VI] measures, and we do not
do so here’ (ibid., para. 250). Yet, quite obviously, by deciding that a qualitative measure such as banning
all remote gambling is, in eﬀect, a quantitative restriction subject to Article XVI, the Appellate Body did
draw that line and, in my view, wrongly so.
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Given the exhaustive nature of the enumerations in each of the Article XVI
deﬁnitions (as conﬁrmed by the Panel itself112), for present purposes, only limitations ‘ in the form of numerical quotas ’ (Article XVI :2(a)) or ‘ expressed
in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas ’113 (Article
XVI :2(c)) are prohibited. Nothing else. Yet, through a rather painful stretch of
the words ‘ form ’ and ‘numerical ’ in Article XVI :2(a), based exclusively on
random dictionary deﬁnitions (a technique it had earlier condemned as ‘ too
mechanical ’114 when engaged in by the Panel), the Appellate Body eﬀectively redeﬁned ‘ form’ as including ‘ eﬀect ’115 and equated ‘ numerical ’ with ‘quantitative ’,116 to conclude that ‘ the thrust of sub-paragraph (a) is not on the form of
limitations, but on their numerical, or quantitative, nature ’.117 Hence, ‘limitations
amounting to a zero quota are quantitative limitations and fall within the scope
of Article XVI :2(a) ’.118 In respect of Article XVI :2(c), it found, without real
explanation, that the covered limitations ‘ cannot take a single form, nor be constrained in a formulaic manner ’ and hence ‘ catch a measure equivalent to a zero
quota ’.119
Unlike the Appellate Body, the Panel at least openly admitted that it went
beyond the explicit deﬁnitions in Article XVI when ﬁnding that ‘a measure that is
not expressed in the form of a numerical quota _ may still fall within the scope
of Article XVI:2(a) ’, adding that ‘ [t]o hold that only restrictions explicitly couched
in numerical terms fall within Article XI :2(a) would produce absurd results ’.120
112 Panel Report on US – Gambling, paras. 6.325 and 6.341.
113 The Panel referred to a comma in the French and Spanish versions of Article XVI:2(c) to ﬁnd that
also limitation ‘in the form of quotas’ not ‘expressed in terms of designated numeral units’ are covered
(ibid., para. 6.343–4). The Appellate Body left this question open and assumed, without deciding the issue,
that Article XVI:2(c) includes only two limitations, namely (1) ‘ expressed in the form of designated
numerical units in the form of quotas,’ and (2) ‘ the requirement of an economic needs test ’.
114 Ibid., para. 166.
115 Ibid., para. 226 (proclaiming, almost metaphysically : ‘ ‘‘form ’’ covers both the mode in which a
thing ‘‘exists’’, as well as the mode in which it ‘‘manifests itself’’. This suggests a broad meaning for the
term ‘‘form’’’). In addition, the Appellate Body referred to other limitations listed in Article XVI:2(a)
which allegedly include certain eﬀects as proof that also the notion of ‘in the form of _ numerical quotas’
must include measures with the eﬀect of a zero quota (ibid., paras. 227–230). Yet, the fact that one
limitation includes certain eﬀects does not mean that another does (rather, a contrario).
116 Ibid., para. 227 (‘Because zero [the eﬀect of a ban on remote gambling] is quantitative in nature, it
can, in our view, be deemed to have the ‘‘characteristics of ’’ a number – that is, to be ‘‘numerical ’’’). The
Appellate Body thereby read the word ‘numerical’ out of the phrase ‘in the form of _ numerical quotas’
as, by deﬁnition, a quota is already quantitative (some additional meaning must be given to the word
‘numerical’).
117 Ibid. para. 232.
118 Ibid., para. 238 (emphasis added).
119 Ibid., para. 247 (emphasis added). The only reason given is that the diﬀerent limitations summed
up in Article XVI:2(c) may overlap. However, the fact that two (or more) deﬁnitions may overlap is not a
reason to deﬁne one of them (i.e., ‘ limitations _ expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the
form of quotas’) broadly. If this phrase was not meant to be limited to explicit numerical quotas, it is hard
to imagine how any phrase could be so limited (in what way could negotiators have been more explicit?).
In sum, the Appellate Body completely ignored the explicit reference to ‘designated numerical units’.
120 Panel Report on US – Gambling, para. 6.332.
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Yet, is it up to a panel or Appellate Body to change the explicit terms of a WTO
provision simply because it does not like their result ?
The 1993 Guidelines seem to have tipped the balance for the Appellate Body.121
As an example under Article XVI :2(a), they mention nationality requirements for
suppliers of services as a limitation ‘ equivalent to zero quota ’. Besides the fact
that the Appellate Body itself found that these Guidelines are not legally binding,
and do not constitute agreed ‘ context’ nor ‘subsequent practice ’ but only
‘ supplementary means of interpretation ’,122 there remains a huge diﬀerence, however, between the zero quota explicit in a nationality requirement and the zero
quota eﬀect of a ban on all remote gambling. A nationality requirement is nothing
but a zero quota on foreigners. The two are exact equivalents and inherently the
same. A nationality requirement is, in other words, nothing more than, and can be
fully replaced by, a zero quota on foreigners. Its sole object is quantity restriction
based on origin. Irrespective of its regulatory purpose or intent, it is a maximum
limitation (of zero) on the number of suppliers. In contrast, a ban on all remote
gambling, whether domestic or foreign, is not the exact equivalent, nor inherently
the same as, a zero quota on cross-border gambling. Because it is a substantive,
quality regulation of how gambling services of any origin are to be provided, in
addition to a ban on cross-border gambling, it is also a ban on domestic internet
gambling. Put diﬀerently, US laws on how gambling services must be supplied in
the United States (i.e. face-to-face) are more than a ban on cross-border gambling
and cannot be fully replaced by a numerical quota : they also ban domestic internet
gambling and, crucially, permit non-remote forms of gambling both domestically
and from overseas. The zero quota on cross-border gambling is only one of the
eﬀects or consequences of the US regulation, not its inherent object. Irrespective of
their regulatory purpose or intent, the US gambling laws are not maximum limitations on the number of suppliers or services. Rather, they impose minimum
requirements (face-to-face supply) on how gambling must be supplied in the
United States. Their object is not quantity restriction, or a ban on cross-border
gambling as such ; it is quality regulation of both foreign and domestic gambling.123
121 Appellate Body Report on US – Gambling, para. 237. Under Article XVI:2(c), the Appellate Body
(at para. 249) refers to the example given in the 1993 Guidelines of ‘restrictions on broadcasting time
available for foreign ﬁlms’. Yet, nothing in that example shows that Article XVI:2(c) was meant to cover
non-numerical restrictions. On the contrary, most restrictions on broadcasting time will be numerical,
expressed, for example, in the number of hours channels can air foreign ﬁlms.
122 Ibid., paras. 178 and 193, see supra note 77. Indeed, in this case one could argue that the text of
Article XVI:2(a) leaves no ambiguity, nor does it result in absurdity, so that no reference can be made to
‘supplementary means of interpretation ’ pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.
123 That Article XVI:2 only prohibits quantitative restrictions as such, not quantitative eﬀects of other
regulations, is conﬁrmed in the 1993 and 2001 (Revised) Scheduling Guidelines which specify that only
licensing or qualiﬁcation requirements that ‘contain any of the limitations speciﬁed in Article XVI’ must
be scheduled (see supra note 85, emphasis added) and that the new disciplines under Article VI :4 ‘cover
domestic regulatory measures which are not regarded as market access limitations as such’ (see 2001
Revised Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 78, at p. 28, emphasis added). It does not suﬃce that they have
the same eﬀects. Contrast, in this respect, Article XVI of GATS with Article 28 of the EC Treaty which
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Another important reason, especially for the Panel, to broadly deﬁne Article
XVI limitations beyond their textual scope, seems to be the risk of abuse, that is,
the risk that WTO Members rephrase their numerical quotas into substantive
regulation so as to avoid the per se prohibition in Article XVI. This risk of
circumvention is, however, minimal, if it exists at all. First, if such bogus regulation
discriminates foreign as against domestic services or suppliers, be it in law or
eﬀect, it will still violate Article XVII (national treatment).124 Second, even
non-discriminatory regulation must meet the conditions in Article VI:4/5. For
example, especially once further disciplines will be developed, such regulation
cannot be ‘more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service’.
In other words, measures construed to circumvent Article XVI will most likely be
weeded out anyhow under Articles XVII or VI. The very objective of Article VI is
to develop disciplines on what regulation can and cannot be accepted under GATS.
It is not for a WTO panel to prejudge this exercise by qualifying domestic regulation as a per se prohibited market access restriction simply because it has the
eﬀect of limiting certain access to the US gambling market.
In contrast, the risk of equating the eﬀect of a zero quota with a numerical quota
is very real. It is the slippery slope of confusing form with eﬀect and banning all
kinds of domestic regulation not because they are quantitative restrictions, but
because they have the obvious eﬀect of keeping certain services or suppliers oﬀ the
market. Drawn to its logical conclusion, it would mean that a driving test for taxi
drivers automatically becomes a prohibited market access restriction simply because aspiring drivers that fail the test do not get a taxi license. Another side eﬀect
of this confusion between form and eﬀect is that it may well force WTO Members
to treat foreigners more favorably than domestic suppliers, as risks being the case
in US – Gambling (where the US could eﬀectively be compelled to permit remote
gambling if it originates from overseas, whilst continue to ban remote gambling
within the United States).
Finally, the fact that the US ban on remote gambling partly coincides with a
complete prohibition on a particular mode of trade in services – in casu, forecloses
all of mode 1 or all cross-border trade through the internet or by telephone – does
not, by deﬁnition, make it a prohibited market access restriction. That domestic
regulation, in eﬀect, bans few, a lot or all trade under a particular mode of
supply may be relevant to decide whether the regulation discriminates against
foreign services or suppliers (under Article XVII) or is ‘ necessary ’ to meet its

prohibits ‘[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent eﬀect’ (see supra
note 34).
124 It can make a diﬀerence, however, when, for the Member concerned, the speciﬁc service sector is
committed only under Article XVI (market access) but not under Article XVII (national treatment). In that
case, construing a measure as one falling only under Article XVII, not Article XVI, would safe it (although
it may still violate Article VI). However, even in that situation, this would seem to be what the WTO
Member concerned agreed to: It agreed not to impose the speciﬁcally deﬁned market access restrictions,
but never committed itself not to discriminate.
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stated objective (under Articles VI :4 or XIV). It is irrelevant, however, for a
decision on whether the measure is a domestic regulation or market access
restriction in the ﬁrst place. For that purpose, the only criterion is the six speciﬁc
deﬁnitions in Article XVI:2. To make a GATT analogy, a ban on asbestos equally
precludes ‘ all means of delivery ’, i.e., all imports normally committed to under
GATT Article XI. That does not automatically make it a prohibited import
restriction (even if its trade impact may be relevant under GATT Articles III
and XX).
A complete ban on internet gambling may, as Antigua argues, not be necessary
to fulﬁll the US objective of face-to-face or inter-personal supply. For example,
technological innovation, such as remote voice recognition, eye-scans or encoding
may ensure that minors are denied access to gambling sites on the internet.
However, it is exactly to answer those questions of scope and necessity of domestic
regulation that Article VI :4 calls for further disciplines.125 A panel should not
prejudge the content of those disciplines nor make their elaboration largely
futile by deciding those questions already under Article XVI, in particular, by
rephrasing domestic regulation with undesirable market access eﬀects as per se
prohibited.
At this point, however, the US gambling laws at issue, although they may violate
the non-discrimination principles in Article XVII (a question not addressed in
this paper, nor decided in the Gambling dispute), cannot be said to violate Article
VI :4/5 (a claim not even invoked by Antigua). As pointed out earlier,126 Article
VI :5 only prohibits technical standards
that nullify or impair _ speciﬁc commitments [under Articles XVI, XVII or
XVIII] in a manner which :
(i) does not comply with the criteria outlined in subparagraphs 4(a), (b) or (c) ; and
(ii) could not reasonably have been expected of that Member at the time the speciﬁc
commitments in those sectors were made.127

The second condition for the US laws to violate Article VI :5 – explicitly stated to
be cumulative to the ﬁrst (because of the word ‘ and ’), is not fulﬁlled. All US laws at
issue pre-date the point in time where the United States made its GATS commitments. Hence, since they were already in place, all of these laws could ‘ reasonably
have been expected of [the US] at the time the speciﬁc commitments ’ were made.
125 Questions of necessity of the US laws may also be examined under Article XIV (e.g., is the measure
‘necessary to protect public morals’), as the Panel did (Panel Report on US – Gambling, paras. 6.475 ﬀ.).
However, as noted earlier (see supra text at notes 27–30), once deﬁned as a market access restriction, the
possible justiﬁcations for it under Articles XIV/XIV bis are much narrower than those available for
domestic regulation under Article VI. Hence, although the measure may still be justiﬁed under Article XIV,
to wrongly qualify it as a market access restriction whilst it is in fact domestic regulation automatically
narrows the scope of justiﬁcations for it and shifts the burden of proof to the regulating country.
126 Supra text at note 23.
127 Emphasis added.
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This reading is conﬁrmed in a Note by the Secretariat stating that indent (ii) of
Article VI :5(a) ‘seem[s] to exempt from Article VI :5 at least all those measures
which were already in place in 1995 ’.128

5. Conclusion
It is surprising that so basic and important an interaction as that between WTO
disciplines on market access and domestic regulation is not more ﬁrmly regulated
in either GATT or GATS. For good economic and political reasons, market
access restrictions such as custom duties, import quotas, and restrictions on
the number of services or service suppliers are, and should be, tightly disciplined.
To the extent committed, they are, in principle, prohibited. In contrast, in
the diverse setting of 150 WTO Members, domestic regulations such as internal
taxes, health or environmental measures, technical speciﬁcations for standards
and rules on how a service must be performed are, and should be, handled with
extreme care. The WTO only prohibits them when they discriminate against
imports or, for some areas, when they are, in essence, more trade restrictive than
necessary.129
Given the consequences, confusing domestic regulation for a market access
restriction – the way, in my view, the Panel and Appellate Body in US – Gambling
and, to some extent, the Tuna – Dolphin panels, did – risks to seriously endanger
the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members to an extent not envisaged by the
drafters of the GATT/WTO treaties.
In an attempt to draw a brighter line between the two disciplines and thereby to
avoid inappropriate encroachment of WTO panels on the regulatory autonomy of
WTO Members, this paper proposes the following rules.
First, under GATT, a measure that applies to both imported and domestic products must, pursuant to the Ad Note to Article III, be subject to Article III, not to
Article XI. For example, a ban on asbestos, or shrimp caught killing turtle, that
applies to both imported and domestic asbestos/shrimp is a domestic regulation
subject to the non-discrimination provision in Article III :4. It is not a per se
prohibited quantitative import restriction under Article XI simply because it also
restricts imported asbestos or shrimp. At least to this extent, Articles III and XI
of GATT are mutually exclusive. This rule should apply irrespective of whether
the measure relates to the physical characteristics of the product or its process or
production method. The Tuna – Dolphin panels that held to the contrary should
be, and in eﬀect have been, set aside.

128 Note by the Secretariat, Article VI:4 of the GATS: Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Applicable
to All Services, S/C/W/96, 1 March 1999, para. 11.
129 Under the SPS or TBT agreements for trade in goods, under Article VI of GATS for trade in
services.
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Second, under GATS, to the extent committed, any measure aﬀecting the supply
of services must be non-discriminatory (under Article XVII) and any measure
meeting one of the six speciﬁc deﬁnitions of market access restrictions (under
Article XVI) is prohibited (unless justiﬁed under Articles XIV and XIV bis).
Crucially, in contrast to GATT, Article XVI of GATS (market access) also applies
to measures that cover both foreign and domestic services or service suppliers.
Hence, the fact that a measure is indistinctly applicable to imports and domestically – as seems the case for the US laws in the Gambling dispute – does not
dis-apply a Member’s market access obligations. Equally, since Article XVII
(national treatment) covers all measures aﬀecting services, including market access
restrictions, one and the same measure can violate the rules on both market
access and national treatment, and the absence of commitments under market
access does not prevent a violation of national treatment.
The central criterion to distinguish the market access restrictions subject to
Article XVI and qualiﬁcation, technical or licensing requirements under Article VI
is that the former explicitly and directly relate to quantity or whether one can at all
have access to the market (e.g., a limit of 10 new banks), the latter regulate the
quality of the service or the ability of its supplier, that is, how a service must
be supplied. Irrespective of the regulatory purpose or intent of the measure
concerned, Article XVI covers maximum limitations, Article VI:4/5 minimum
requirements. Although the two types of measures can overlap (licensing requirements may, for example, take the form of market access restrictions), their
interaction is not explicitly regulated in the GATS. A contextual interpretation
demonstrates that, in contrast to GATT, domestic regulation under GATS remains
subject also to market access disciplines. Conversely, with the exception of
the 1998 Accountancy Disciplines, no textual support can be found to exclude
domestic regulation disciplines as soon as a measure is a market access restriction.
To provide legal certainty, it is important that any future disciplines on domestic
regulation explicitly regulate their relationship to Articles XVI and XVII. The
important diﬀerences in this respect between GATT and GATS are largely
explained by GATS’ broad (and, therefore, overlapping) scope of application of
both market access and domestic regulation which, in turn, can be explained given
the exit option provided for, only in GATS, to schedule or reserve measures that
would otherwise be violations.
Given the continued application of market access disciplines even to domestic
regulation, to preserve the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members under GATS it
is, however, crucially important to narrowly deﬁne prohibited market access restrictions. If not, regulatory freedom under Article VI risks being emptied through
per se prohibitions under Article XVI. The list of six restrictions in Article XVI is
exhaustive, as is the enumeration under each of those six deﬁnitions. In addition,
services measures, in particular qualiﬁcation, licensing or technical requirements
and procedures (as deﬁned in Article VI :4) are not prohibited market access restrictions simply because their qualitative regulation of a service or its supplier also
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has a quantitative eﬀect on the services or suppliers that can enter the market. For
example, a driving test for taxi drivers or requirement that gambling occurs faceto-face – respectively a qualiﬁcation requirement related to the ability of the supplier and a technical standard on how a service must be performed, both subject to
Article VI – are not market access restrictions per se prohibited under Article XVI
simply because they also restrict the number of taxi drivers (by excluding those
that fail the driving test), or the number of gambling services and suppliers
(by excluding remote gambling).
It can only be hoped that the Appellate Body will be willing and able to
distinguish the US laws in Gambling – i.e., the eﬀect of a complete prohibition
or zero quota that fully coincides with a particular mode of services supply, in that
a ban on remote gambling includes a ban on all cross-border trade – from other
domestic regulation with a less drastic quantitative eﬀect.130 This will, however,
require creative interpretations of the Appellate Body ruling itself and no longer
be based on the text of the GATS which, in turn, may draw the criticism of
judicial activism. In this sense, the damage is done but room for correction remains
available.

130 At para. 232 the Appellate Body may be hinting at such distinction (‘This is not to say that the
words ‘‘in the form of’’ should be ignored or replaced by the words ‘‘that have the eﬀect of’’ ’).

